TURKPULSE No:1 ............................OCTOBER 4th, 1999
The US’s bird’s-eye-view outlook of world affairs has made PM Ecevit’s Washington visit an unexpected success of universal importance for Turkey. The formation of G-20 and Turkey’s inclusion was certainly a great realism for American diplomacy and a practical solution concerning the controversy over Turkey’s full membership to the EU. This achievement was recorded despite the existing, if not widening, policy differences of the two countries on international issues such as Cyprus, Saddam, the Caucuses, and the Middle East.
The media and public were in two minds about PM Ecevit’s official visit to Washington between September 27th and 30th. The general tendency was to describe it as a historic visit of the highest importance for Turkey’s future developments. The second train of thought was the exact opposite - nothing would come out of it as there was no concession Turkey would give on Cyprus, Northern Iraq or similar issues of importance to Washington.
No change of policy on international disputes
Indeed, Ecevit was most outspoken in telling American congressmen that there was no Cyprus problem: there was peace and security on the island since the Turkish intervention in 1974. This statement was diametrically opposed to what US Secretary of Defence Cohen said in Ankara a few months ago that the present situation in Cyprus was not acceptable.
The situation on other international disagreements between Turkey and the United States was no different. Turkey’s help to the Iraqi Opposition Front was out of the question despite Washington’s efforts to topple the Saddam regime in Iraq with such a Front. The US-backed Iraqi Kurdish leader, Jelal Talabani, was in Washington during PM Ecevit’s visit and exerting strenuous efforts to have a talk with him. Far from being satisfied with Ecevit about Turkey’s help to found a federation with the Kurds in Iraq, Washington witnessed that 5000 Turkish soldiers led an incursion into Northern Iraq to eliminate armed PKK bands there. That was the answer in practice that Talabani was seeking in Washington during Ecevit’s visit.
On the Caucusus front, the gap between Ankara and Washington was no smaller after Ecevit’s visit. Shortly before the visit, the MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) issued an official statement denouncing the bomb outrages in Moscow by Muslim fundamentalists from Dagestan or Chechnya. While the Chechen crisis had turned into a nightmare of a chronic and painful civil war for Moscow five years ago, the uprising in Dagestan simply flopped within a few days this time. Into the bargain, the Russian Army has begun to punish Chechen extremists with charges of supporting violence by Islamic fundamentalists in the former Soviet Union world. Why was the Chechen war so painful and impossible to settle to Russia’s satisfaction in 1994 and so relatively easy to handle by Moscow this time? The difference was between Ciller and Ecevit holding the reins in Turkey. PM Ciller’s adventures in the Caucusus going as far as using some Grey Wolves in an attempt to kill President Aliyev are common knowledge. Consequently, Moscow faced tremendous difficulties in handling the Chechen uprising 4-5 years ago. Today there is no Prime Minister in Turkey suspected of CIA connections and consequently, the handling of similar disturbances in Dagestan and Chechnya is plain sailing for Moscow compared to a few years ago. At that time Moscow was complaining that the CIA-backed Turkish extremists, the MHP’s "idealists", were supporting the Chechen rebels with a flow of arms, logistics and militants from Turkey. Today the MHP is an important coalition partner in Turkey, but, under its new leader, Devlet Bahceli, it is almost thoroughly purged from these fundamentalists. Among some other factors concerning the Russians, this is the difference in the Dagestan and Chechnya events between 1994 and 1999.
G-20 to help Turkey have a say in international economics
Despite Washington’s dissatisfaction of Turkey on these and similar issues, the American realism in diplomacy induced it to take a more realistic step than Europe about Turkey’s place in the world among the multinational economic blocs. Thus the formation of G-20 and Turkey’s admission came into existence. It is in addition to Washington’s sincere efforts and pledge to work for the elimination of the Luxembourg rebuff in December 1997.
It is now expected that in Helsinki in December the European Union will include Turkey in the list of 11 candidates for accession to the Union to satisfy Ankara. In practice, however, it means nothing much as Turkey’s full membership to the Union is bound to take another decade or two.
Yet a very effective formation is taking place about Turkey’s position among the economic blocs. It concerns the bilateral Turkish-Russian economic co-operation and the BSEC (Black Sea Economic Co-operation).
Russia and Ukraine are the two biggest countries of Europe. With its Asian parts Turkey is almost as big as Germany and these three non-EU countries have now special economic relations to form an economic free zone. Today Russia is Turkey’s second biggest trade partner, but is heading for top place rapidly. It is estimated that in 2007 the Turkish-Russian trade volume will reach $50 billion. The next step will be $100 billion, with the Russian and Central Asian natural gas flowing into energy-thirsty Turkey and Turkish consumer goods flooding Russian markets, hungry for luxurious goods. Koc’s Ram department stores in Moscow have been working very effectively despite the economic crisis in Russia since August 1998 and Russian rulers have appreciated it greatly as it eased their pain at a critical point of their radical economic transition. It also helped Turkey in its drive for exports. The giant Turkish Trade Centre will be inaugurated in Moscow within a couple of years to channel this impressive trade. Rising oil prices in the world is a factor greatly facilitating this development.
President Clinton launched the idea of G-20 and included Turkey, which was an important gesture and step in Turkey’s favour. Something better than that would be free trade arrangements with Turkey along the lines of the special relations the United States has with Canada, Mexico and Israel. At the end of his official visit to Washington PM Ecevit talked of a strategic alliance with the United States and certain arrangements may yet be made until President Clinton’s visit to Turkey in mid-November. As things stand at the moment the G-20 arrangement and $108 million additional textile quotas in two years are the only tangible gains for Turkey. In short, Ecevit’s visit was far from setting in motion the economic potential in mutual relations, but it was a useful get-together that was needed in US-Turkish relations. uras@ada.net.tr, October 4th, 1999