PULSE of TURKEY No 58...................SUNDAY, OCTOBER 4^th 1998

The official warnings Turkey has issued about Syria supporting PKK terrorism has reached the level of strongly worded public statements by the President, the Prime Minister and top-level commanders. In his October 1^st address to the nation President Demirel announced that Turkey’s patience with Syria was running out and that Turkey was reserving the right to retaliate. PM Mesut Yılmaz said he had not spoken enough, Syria deserved worse than that. General Kıvrakoğlu, the Chief TGS (Turkish General Staff), said there was an undeclared war between Turkey and Syria.

Ankara scrutinizes the changed nature of “aggression” in international law 

The fact that the PKK terrorism is still continuing in the southeast despite the deadly blows delivered to it by successful military operations was an eye opener for Turkish rulers about the sources of this terrorism. Ankara began to realize that it is impossible to end terrorism as long as its neighbours continue to harbour these armed gangs. One of the biggest authorities on this topic, Gerard Challand says in his book, “Terrorismes et Guerillas”, that it is impossible for a successful guerrilla to survive without external support and especially a base abroad. “Base and shelter are vitally important in this external support. Base and shelter are the lungs of the guerrilla. Everything should be done for logistics support through this way for the continuation of the action. A guerrilla with its logistics lines cut off means a dead guerrilla.”

The new war in the world is not fought between two armies crossing the national frontier, but through infiltration of subversive elements through the common border - from “a base and shelter abroad”, as Gerard Challand puts it. This realization through experience in the southeast induced the TGS to draw up new defence plans and the centre of the threat for Turkey shifted from the North to the South when these calculations were completed. The National Security Council’s deliberations of these plans and calculations resulted in the judgement voiced by General Kıvrakoğlu, “There is an undeclared war between Turkey and Syria.”

What does Syria want of Turkey?

Since 1989 the PKK chief, Abdullah Öcalan, has been living in Damascus or Syria-controlled Syrian or Lebanese territories, and with financing, supplies and armament from various western sources via Syria this terrorism was becoming a never-ending headache for Turkey.

That Syria has a claim on Hatay and refuses to carry out frontier demarcation lines with Turkey has been known since that province was annexed to Turkey before World War II, during the French rule in Syria. But given the balance (or rather imbalance) of power between Turkey and Syria, Ankara has never taken it as a security threat and treated Syria’s unlawful claims with unprecedented tolerance.

Likewise, Syrian and Iraqi claims for more water from the Euphrates and Tigris have been known for years and Ankara has been trying to find solutions to that problem for the last 20-25 years. To coax Syria during the last 14 years, while PKK terrorism has been going on in the southeast, Ankara even came round to pledging a certain amount of water to Syria through the Euphrates (500 m³ per second) and it was later increased. But it did not solve the problem either other than temporary improvement at times. Syria was getting these concessions and continuing with its support of terrorism, again for more concessions.

Turkey’s patience finally ran out and two Notes were handed to Syria in January 1996 announcing the de-linking of the water questions from terrorism. By doing so Ankara aimed at dissuading Damascus from harbouring and channelling logistics to the PKK. It would also pave the way for potential sanctions to and indemnity claims from Syria if its support went on.

The present Yılmaz Government, within its “Good Neighbour Dialogue” policy of improving relations with all the neighbouring countries, made a fresh attempt to dissuade Syria from harbouring terrorism. On July 2nd Ankara handed Damascus a very mildly worded “Declaration of Principles” to base mutual relations on new principles. This 10-point document, which was never answered by Syria in writing, included such principles as observation of territorial integrity, respect of sovereignty rights, non-interference in domestic affairs, refraining from mutually aggressive policies, issuing full pledges for not supporting terrorists and eliminating problems within the spirit of good neighbours. To win Syria over to this policy Ankara carefully refrained from any suggestions about Syrian support of the PKK and did not mention the PKK in the Declaration. It also changed its policy of “No dialogue with Syria before it solves the PKK question first” and suggested starting talks on all issues simultaneously.

The Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister, Adnan Omran, who visited Ankara at the beginning of July, seemed to be willing to accept these principles and Ankara felt a certain optimism with the change of the intelligence chiefs in Syria after Omran’s return home. Time showed, however, that the optimism was unwarranted and that President Assad was not receptive to Turkey’s suggestions. He recently pensioned off Adnan Omran instead of listening to his counsel. It was only a part of the liquidation of other Syrian rulers advocating a dialogue with Turkey and President Assad himself was carrying out this anti-Turkish purge in Syria.

Policies annoying Turkey have greatly continued in full swing under the Assad regime:

• The PKK’s side organization ERNK held meetings in Damascus and drew up centrally guided policies such as campaigning worldwide against Turkey. It organized sessions of a “Kurdish parliament in exile”, starting with the Netherlands in 1995 and then in Austria, Denmark, Norway and now Italy. Even though it was a much bigger planned action by the West against Turkey, ERNK was the tool and Damascus was the centre of these activities.
• Even exceeding the limits of the waters issue, Damascus has recently launched a worldwide campaign, especially in the Arab and non-aligned world, against Turkey over its cooperation with Israel.
• Syria has cut off the waters of the River Assi (Orontes), thus harming the farmers in Hatay, as this is the only trans-border river that starts in Syria and reaches the sea in Turkey. It also objects to GAP instead of accepting Turkey’s plans and proposals for cooperating with Turkey on common agricultural projects in order to make the most of these rivers.
• Syria increased its territorial waters to 35 miles in the Mediterranean much to Turkey’s objection.
• The 40,000 strong Turkmen community in Syria is oppressed and is now being displaced from the frontier areas to inland Syria. Their children who come to Turkey for education are discriminated against on their return home, while these frontier populations used to pass freely across the common frontier with certain simple “passavants” documents without requiring passports in the past.
• The 1921 Treaty of Ankara signed between Turkey and France makes provisions for keeping Turkish soldiers in Jaber Castle, 30 km inland from the Turkish frontier. The tomb of Suleiman Shah is also located there and two squads of Turkish soldiers are rotated there twice a month. Syria has recently attempted to move this castle elsewhere because it would remain under the Teshrin dam’s waters. Turkey has rejected changing this treaty right and continues flying the Turkish flag and keeping 20 Turkish soldiers there.

What will Turkey do under these conditions?

Turkey’s 14 years of efforts for solving the terrorism question with Syria through diplomacy are now coming to an end and the dispute is moving from diplomacy into the military field.

It was the Ground Forces Commander, General Atilla Ateş, who started this new phase when he said during inspections in Reyhanlı, on the Syrian frontier, “Our patience has run out. If they do not take the necessary measures we, the Turkish nation, will. Hatay is an inseparable part of Turkey. Our ancestors left it to us.”

When Syria attempted to protest General Ateş’s statement, the protest Note was rejected outright and Syrian diplomats were told that General Ateş was not speaking of his own accord. He was voicing Turkey’s national policy. And the tough statements of the President, the Prime Mİnister and the Chief, TGS followed General Ateş’s first warning. The Turkish Armed Forces are now putting muscles to these warnings by rolling tanks in Kilis near Syria and flying jets low along the Turkish side of the frontier. Official sources describe these moves as a “military deterrent strategy.” These activities have not yet gone as far as force concentration on the Syrian frontier, because the MFA is opposing the idea at this stage. After the ongoing NATO exercises in the Iskenderun area, the Dynamic Mix 98, other military activities will continue in the region, a few miles away from Syria, as part of this military deterrent strategy. What if President Assad still takes no notice and continues with his acts of provocation, with or without certain encouragement he may be receiving from abroad?

Turkey’s meticulously prepared plans also foresee that probability and include measures about it too. Syria will then realize that Turkey is not bluffing. What will happen will happen. Would military action against Syria, which is the weaker country, not put Turkey in the embarrassing position of an aggressor, in spite of everything? After all, the PKK moved its military camps to Northern Iraq and only installations for ideological training, intelligence, health and recreation have been left in Syria. The MFA has long been seeking the answer to that question and here is the answer.

The remedy for terrorism will be found within UN Charter

The Turkish answer to Syrian provocation will be totally within the rules of international law. Naturally, the United Nations Charter and especially Chapter VII concerning “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression” were the first documents to come under the magnifying glass in Ankara.

The famous Article 51 about “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence” was scrutinized in all detail in the light of over half-a-century practice of the UN system. It was eventually found irrelevant because it concerned “an armed attack” against a member country and there was no such situation in regard to Syria. Far from an armed attack on Turkey, Syria was not even keeping a military force on the Turkish border and had left frontier security against infiltration to Turkish soldiers.

The aggression against Turkey being indirect and through subversion, a clause had to be found within the UN Charter and indeed it was – Article 2, Paragraph 4. It reads:

“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” 

This article perfectly conforms to the “Syrian aggression” against Turkey. Terrorists harboured in Damascus had been planning, financing and executing terrorist activities against Turkey since August 15^th, 1984 and they were expressly announcing worldwide that their aim was to found a Kurdish State, that is to say against Turkey’s territorial integrity.

As for Syria, it has land claims on Turkey. Maps hung up on the walls of government offices in Syria show Hatay within Syrian territory. As for “political independence” in Article 2 (4), it means the capability of a country to take decisions in favour of its national interests. It is common knowledge that Syria has been trying to affect in its favour the trans-border waters issue with Turkey by using the PKK.

Even though Syrian aggression against Turkey through the PKK is obvious, for the justification of military action by Turkey against Syria, terrorist activities should reach the dimensions of war under Article 3 (g) of the UN General Assembly statement 3314 concerning the definition of “aggression”. This requirement of international law has long been fulfilled by Syria and the PKK with massive terrorist activities and brutalities against the civilian population in Turkey.

In other words, Turkish diplomacy, the Turkish Armed Forces and the Turkish nation as a whole are ready to go all the way in the case of Syria and it is very unlikely that there will be anyone in the world who would be surprised by such a military action. What is surprising is that Turkey has shown such great patience and self-restraint over such a big provocation for such a long time. Having said that no one should take it for granted that the Turkish Armed Forces would cross over the Syrian frontier tomorrow. There are other steps to take in retaliation within Turkey’s policy of patience towards Syria.

Why did Ankara act now after 14 years of patience?

Above all, Turkey’s latest moves are acts to prevent a war, rather than a wish to attack a neighbour. Just as Ankara’s firm announcement that increasing territorial waters to 12 miles in the Aegean is “casus belli” prevents a Turkish-Greek war rather than being belligerent behaviour on the part of Turkey, so are the latest moves towards Damascus. These warnings are for the elimination of the conditions that are bound to cause a war eventually, no matter how patient Turkey may try to be. This is because Ankara reckons that a war with Syria may provide the West with the opportunity to proclaim the Kurdish UDI in the region and that is the last thing Turkey wants to see.

Between 1992 and 1994 Turkey’s cooperation with Iran and Syria was one of the main reasons for the prevention of the Kurdish UDI. Now that Washington has taken new steps for Kurdish independence by eliminating Turkey from the “Ankara Process”, Turkish-Iranian-Syrian cooperation is critically needed. This cooperation is only possible by eliminating the “Assad factor” from Turkish-Syrian relations

It is claimed that the Assad family cooperates with the PKK so that it can get enormous sums of “black money” from drug trafficking run by the PKK. Now that the dying Hafez Assad has taken steps to continue with the “Assad Dynasty” in Syria, Turkey has felt it necessary to indicate to Syria that the existing Assad-PKK cooperation cannot possibly go on as far as Turkey is concerned.

Another reason for Turkey’s action today is the observation by the Turkish Armed Forces that 30% of the recently captured or killed PKK members are Syrian nationals of Armenian origin or other Syrians. In consequence, the PKK can never be eradicated as long as this harbouring and sheltering of the PKK continues. Ankara has prepared detailed publications identifying the Syrian nationals captured in the ranks of the PKK and their testimonies to prove Syrian involvement in PKK terrorism. They will be shown to the world if a war proves unavoidable with Syria.

Finally, the war with Syria will be a “Blitzkrieg” lasting less than 48 hours against the military targets and terrorist nests, no matter how much PM Netanyahu tries to facilitate Syrian troop movements to the Turkish frontier by suspending Israeli military activities. After the elimination of the Assad-Öcalan cronies from the face of the earth the military attack is bound to come to an end and Turkey has to deliver the least harm to the civilian people of Syria. Given the impeccable efficacy of the Turkish Armed Forces and the experience they have gained over the last 14 years, one can confidently believe that this will be achieved perfectly. Then rather than a deep-rooted hatred over a war, the Syrian people, whose 85% Sunni majority is currently being oppressed by the 15% Shiite led by the Assad family, may feel gratitude towards Turkey. uras@ada.net.tr, October 4^th, 1998

Back