PULSE of TURKEY No:91 ............................FEBRUARY 17th,  1999

 

TURKISH ENTEBBE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT BLOODSHED

PKK terrorist chief Abdullah Öcalan was brought to Turkey handcuffed from Nairobi at 3 a.m. (local time) on February 16th with a historic undercover operation. The biggest question is how the Turkish security forces carried out this unbelievably successful operation so smoothly and which foreign intelligence service helped them. The answer partially rests in the course of Öcalan’s adventures since he left Rome on January 16th. For the intriguing story of this brilliant success story of Turkey’s security and intelligence services see the article below.

Israeli commandoes’ security operation in Uganda’s Entebbe airport years ago drew the admiration of the world as a perfect security operation to save hostages from Idi Amin’s brutality. It went down in history as a very well planned and successful security operation hundreds of miles away from home.

The operation carried out by their Turkish counterparts only yesterday in Nairobi, not very far from Entebbe and at a much bigger distance from base clearly outshined even that perfect operation. Without bloodshed, Turkish commandoes landed at Nairobi Airport, went to the Greek Embassy’s safehouse and took the notorious terrorist chief Abdullah Öcalan to the airport only to handcuff him and bring to Turkey after seven hours of flight. It was the end of a top secret security operation by the Turkish Government for the last 12 days. When PM Bülent Ecevit announced the outcome at 11 a.m. on Tuesday (16th) his voice was shaking in excitement according to the BBC. He said that only ten persons knew about it in Turkey.

These ten persons were President Süleyman Demirel, PM Bülent Ecevit, Chief TGS (Turkish General Staff) General Hüseyin Kývrýkoðlu, his assistant General Hilmi Özkök, Deputy PM Hüsamettin Özkan, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, Air Force Commander General Ýlhan Kýlýç, TGS Operations Chief Lt. General Yaþar Büyükanýt, Under-Secretary of MIT Þenkal Atasagun and Commander of the Special Operations Force, Major General Engin Alan.

The course of the operation 

Everybody is unanimous that such an undercover operation cannot possibly be carried out hundreds of miles away from home without the help of a great power’s intelligence service. Yet PM Ecevit carefully refrains from answering such questions. So before going into this question one must go into the details of Öcalan’s moves after he had to leave Syria in early October to stay in Russia for about a month until November 12th, 1998 when he proceeded to Italy for over two months.

Leaving aside the details of Italy’s unwise hospitality to Öcalan which it could not possibly sustain under international rules and as an ally in NATO, it was noteworthy that Öcalan had to leave Rome on January 16th, on board a private aircraft, Learjet 55, hired from an Italian company. The aircraft landed at Gorki Airport in Russia the same day. It stayed there for 16 days in which period there was an intensive communication between the Turkish and Russian Foreign Ministries. During that period the aircraft and Öcalan cut off all communication with the outside world.

But, in the last days of January, Turkish intelligence services, which had taken the aircraft under constant surveyance and monitoring, reported to the Ecevit Government that there was some activity in the aircraft. The aircraft suddenly flew towards Rotterdam on February 1st but the Dutch Government would not repeat Italy’s mistake. It did not accept Öcalan’s aircraft other than for a short while for refuelling. Meanwhile, a “reliable source” informed Turkey that Öcalan’s aircraft was in Rome, but PM Ecevit took that information with a pinch of salt. Nevertheless, he passed that information on to the press as a possibility without revealing this “reliable source”. He would say to the media after the completion of the Öcalan operation that such erroneous information helped them because they could cover up their real operation thanks to such disinformation.

From Rotterdam Öcalan’s aircraft flew to a small airfield near Athens for refuelling and a short stay. Then it disappeared. Between February 2nd-15th Öcalan was in Nairobi, first in the Greek Ambassador’s comfortable residence as a guest and then in a Greek safehouse from where the Turkish commandoes took him to Nairobi Airport and then to Turkey. The Kenyan Government is now preparing to declare personna non grata the Greek ambassador for these subversive activities.

During this 12-day operation and period of preparation for the Turkish commandoes, Atatürk’s principle in the final offensive against the Greeks was in force in Ankara. Before the great offensive against the Greek occupation forces which ended up in driving them into the sea in Ýzmir on September 9th, 1922, Commander-in-chief General Mustafa Kemal was asked how he would organize the logistics. His famous answer was “iaþe ibate düþmandan” (the enemy will supply the food and logistics.)

In the latest undercover operation to capture Öcalan too there appeared the question of how to conceal it from the world. The answer was, as seen from PM Ecevit’s revelations, “The disinformation is from the other side. All you have to do is play the fool.”

Which intelligence service helped Turkey?

The common belief is that Turkey was helped by a foreign intelligence service in this operation and PM Ecevit is not saying that it is not the case. He only refrains from talking about it, but firmly rejects the claim that the Greek intelligence helped the operation. The widespread belief throughout the world is that the CIA or Mossad is the force behind this magnificient undercover operation.

About criticisms of MIT (the Turkish Secret Service) for not capturing Öcalan, MIT Chief Þenkal Atasaðun told Hürriyet (February 3rd), “We may have shortcomings. No organisation is perfect. But on the question of Öcalan our organization has manifested a good performance. It has manifested a performance above world intelligence organizations. We learnt many key moves of Apo (Öcalan) beforehand and informed the top authorities of the State about them.” Answering a question about the Russian behaviour he said, “Russian Intelligence has played the three monkeys on us. Each time they told us that they knew nothing about it when we communicated to them that Öcalan was in their country. Our strategy does not deviate from the main philosophy against terroýrism. Our main departing point against terrorism is that you may run away, but you cannot be kept hidden. We will sustain this struggle with patience and with the methods used by civilized nations.”

Invited to comment on this statement, Russian Ambassador Lebedev told Milliyet (4th), “Russian Intelligence organizations are here. He should tell that to them.” It was taken as a hint that Moscow had sent intelligence experts to Ankara for the Öcalan case, reports the reputable Istanbul daily.

It is still too early for the details of the Nairobi operation and the international intelligence assistance extended to the Turkish commandoes, but it is apparent that a serious blow has been delivered by Turkey to what President Demirel calls “the attempts to revive the Sèvres”.

It is also confirmation of this publication’s insistance on the formation of the Ecevit Government even when he was preparing to hand back his duty to President Demirel in frustration of getting the necessary support for his Government. Pulse reported on December 8th, 1998 in this precarious period:

“Everything now depends on the formation of the new Government in Turkey and PM designate Ecevit has made his contacts with DYP Chairperson Tansu Çiller after PM Mesut Yýlmaz in an effort to form a tripartite coalition. Çiller emphatically said that her party had no objection to Bülent Ecevit, but it was against the procedure followed by the President in this regard. At the time of writing this article Çiller’s answer for the future of the Ecevit Government was not known, but one thing is certain, the alternative to the Ecevit Government is another Ecevit Government – that by Çankaya under articles 114 and 116 of the Constitution. It is simply because Europe is bent on reviving Sèvres and an Ecevit Government is the best way of fighting these efforts under the existing conditions, believe the President and the security forces, as seen from Demirel’s statements.

“Apparently unaware of these intricacies of Turkish politics and the Constitution, a high-level member of the American delegation under Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said to the press in Brussels, ‘I have my doubts about Ecevit becoming the Prime Minister. It is still unclear. There are technical and political difficulties about forming the coalition government. We, the USA, will definitely work with him if he forms the government and receives the vote of confidence.’ (Hürriyet, December 6th).

“It is certainly unwise to claim ‘100 per cent certainty’ because there is no such categorical assurance in Turkish politics and Pulse has committed that blunder in its last article because it was a matter of reviving Sèvres or not. At such a critical time one can easily talk of 100 per cent certainty in Turkey’s future political developments if one is following the developments closely. We will see before long who is mistaken.”

The factors which made DSP Chairman Bülent Ecevit the Prime Minister of Turkey with just over one-tenth of the seats in Parliament were the reasons for the remarkable success in the Nairobi operation against Abdullah Öcalan. What other steps will follow this achievement will be the subject of future articles by Pulse.  uras@ada.net.tr, February 17th, 1999

 

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