TURKEY’S PLACE IN BUSH’S “WITH OR AGAINST” CRITERIA

 

The Damascus conference of Iraq’s bordering countries last week was an excellent measuring-stick in determining Turkey’s place in Washington’s appraisals of other countries under President Bush’s criteria, “you are either with me or against”. Of the seven participants, six bordering countries plus Egypt, two (Kuwait and Jordan) were blindly with or for the United States, two (Iran and Syria) were equally against it and the remaining three, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, were less clear in their distances to Washington. For an objective analysis of Turkey’s place therein in the light of the “strategic cooperation” nonsense between Turkey and the United States, please see the article below.

 

The mere inauguration and the entire conduct of the Damascus conference on 1 and 2 November was a test for the participants about their relationships with the United States which did everything in its power to forestall the realisation of these three conferences held at Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul’s energetic initiatives in his capacity as PM of Turkey at the time of the first two, before the 1 March rebuff.

Iraq’s participation in Damascus conference constituted the first obstacle

The third conference of bordering countries to Iraq was opened with delays in Damascus last week because of Super Power objection which resorted to its usual tactics of exploiting the sensitive points to the participants, but Turkey’s millennium’s of experience in diplomacy and world affairs rendered them all ineffective, causing only some delays in conducting the conference.

Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari’s invitation to the conference evoked the first problem in every respect. “Foreign Minister” of what, Iraq or the Governing Council of Iraq was the first question. The pro-American participants nearly managed to “nip it in the bud” by claiming that Syria had not “properly” invited Zebari to the conference and they enjoyed Saudi Arabia’ and Egypt’s support in the accusation. Even though a Kurd’s assignment as Foreign Minister of Iraq in the Governing Council, with disproportionate  Kurdish presence far above their rate to the total population of Iraq, was a sensitive point for Turkey, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul cleverly avoided this issue from being a stumbling block for the conference and sided with sending another invitation to Zebari as he had demanded, the “Foreign Minister of Iraq.” Zebari still found the two invitations “vague” and refrained from attending the Damascus conference in accordance with the American wishes, according to Turkey’s appraisals. But his absence did not result in calling off the Damascus conference. It only induced the conference, at Turkey’s initiative, to withdraw the title, “Foreign Minister of Iraq” and in the final communiqué was referred to as the “Foreign Minister of the Governing Council” for Zabari.

Having thus transcended over the first hurdle the conference got down to brass tacks with a day’s delay and, with Turkey’s undeniable contributions, reached a number of important decisions about the future of Iraq, with a decision to continue with these conferences, the next one to be in Kuwait. The importance of the continuation of these conference is that a strong front is appearing in the region especially among Turkey. Iran, Syria and probably Saudi Arabia against the American led coalition’s apparent plans to divide Iraq into three with a Kurdish State in the north, a Shiite one in the south and a weak Sunni one in between.

Iraq’s absence saved the Governing Council and the real force behind it, the Americans’ CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority), from Turkey’s pressure about conforming to the international rule of no support to or harbouring of terrorists in regard to the PKK/KADEK presence in northern Iraq. Nevertheless, Turkey managed to get this point endorsed by all the seven participants, along with other points important to Turkey in its Iraq and Gulf policies.

Turkey’s place among Iraq’s neighbours

Iran and Syria were emphatic at the Damascus conference that the Governing Council was designated by the United States and consequently it did not represent the Iraqi people. This was initially the outlook of Turkey too and it kept on saying in regard to the deployment of Turkish forces in Iraq that the real power in Iraq rested with the CPA, that is the Americans. However, after UN Security Council resolution 1511 Ankara tuned down this view, because it gave some international legitimacy to the Governing Council by “Welcoming the positive response of the international community…to the establishment of the broadly representative Governing Council as an important step towards an internationally recognized, representative government.”

In return, Resolution 1511 provided Turkey with the necessary international backing for its plans to organize the bordering countries against the American efforts to create an Iraq with the Kurds in key positions and the backbone of the new State as it (Resolution 1511) “emphasizes the importance of strengthening the cooperation of the countries of the region, particularly neighbours of Iraq” especially for the prevention of the transit of terrorists to Iraq and “for the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control of their own natural resources.” Again at Turkey’s initiative the final communiqué confirmed these principles.

FM Abdullah Gul’s spokesmen summed up the outcome of the Damascus conference as follows:

• The seven participants gave assurances about the preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity.
• They pledged to jointly prevent the utilisation of Iraq’s territory by terrorists. It was noteworthy that this definition primarily covers the PKK/KADEK activities against Turkey while the American definitions call for “prevention of the transit of terrorists to Iraq” from Iran, Syria and the USA‘s new target in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia.
• The bordering countries’ conferences will continue. This will happen despite the intense dislike of the Americans, but the fact that Kuwait will be the next host it may be a great hurdle in the way of the realisation of the fourth conference whose date has not been fixed. This, for its part, may result in the tightening of the ranks among the opponents of the Coalition with Turkey’s more open participation in front.

In other words, far from the untrue claims of “strategic cooperation” between Turkey and the United States, Turkey is gradually falling into President Bush’s “against” category in Iraq and the Middle East despite the care both sides take for the prevention of its ill-effects on Turkish-American relations. As for the frequently exploited strategic cooperation claim, the former Foreign Minister of Turkey, Ismail Cem, has begun to say that he does not know where that term originated. There is no bilateral or multilateral agreement signed by Turkey and the United States that has such an expression  “strategic cooperation,” he emphasises.

Damascus conference precipitates Washington’s Iraq moves without Turkey

On 7 November, exactly a month after the Turkish parliament’s decision to permit the Erdogan government to deploy forces in Iraq in accordance with the Americans’ persistent pressures, Ankara and Washington officially announced that Turkey had given up sending troops to Iraq. Four days before that the State Department spokesman Richard Boucher had said that they were still having talks with Turkey about finding the best way of deploying Turkish forces in Iraq to satisfy all the parties concerned. It was obvious that the Damascus conference had precipitated Washington’s decision to have “Iraqi soldiers” instead of the Turkish ones to restore peace and security in Iraq, as Americans are planning to reduce their 135,000 strong forces in Iraq by one third to 105,000 within six months, despite the surging violence in especially the Sunni sectors of the country.

Ankara suspects that this move is aimed at planting Kurdish officers in the new Iraqi Army within Washington’s traditional policy of creating a Kurdish State in the region step by step or at least bringing the Kurds into key positions in the new Iraq. The Bush Administration is working for a Kurdish, Israeli and American hegemony in the region with the help of the “coalition” countries and it all goes diametrically opposed to Turkey’s plans.

During the preparations made for deployment of Turkish forces in Iraq, Turkey invited several tribal chiefs from Iraq to work out a peaceful work atmosphere there. The Sunni community leaders complained that the Kurds were massively buying lands in especially the Kirkuk region with Israeli financing. Turkish authorities’ investigations proved that it was true and Ankara approached to Israel to dissuade it from resorting to such far reaching destabilisation moves in the region. PM Erdogan showed his disenchantment of Israel by declining to see PM Sharon in Ankara on his way back from Moscow last week.

FM Gul said during and after the Damascus conference that If Turkey sees a danger from the PKK or other sources it can militarily intervene in Iraq as international law permits it. Needless to say, during the 7 November announcements of no Turkish force deployment in Iraq, Ankara turned down the American initiatives of withdrawing the Turkish soldiers that are stationed in northern Iraq since April 1995. The seven regional countries’ Damascus resolutions further reinforced Turkey’s hand in this dispute with the Americans and the Kurds, believe Turkish diplomatic quarters.

In short, the developments of the last few weeks moved Turkey and the United States further away in their Iraq and Middle East policies with a firm determination of Turkey to seek allies within and outside the Gulf region for its plans to offset the super power weight of the United States. uras@ada.net.tr – November 9^th, 2003