TURKPULSE No:86..........DECEMBER 28th, 2002
Failed policy is reinforced with additional devices
This policy clearly went bankrupt in August 1990 when Iraq attacked Kuwait, and proved that the small emirates of the Gulf were unable to defend themselves against a bully within the region, let alone against the aggression of a strong outside power. Yet this policy still holds good for Turkey for all regions, as proved by President Sezer’s statement that “the defence of Afghanistan belongs to the Afghan people”. The secret in Turkey’s persistence in this failed policy is that it has since reinforced this policy with the principle of the supremacy of law in international relations as a device to make up for the shortfall of this principle in theory and the defence and security arrangements for different regions of the world in practice. Today both these devices fall at odds with Washington’s dual confinement policy against Iran and Iraq and intentions to demise of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.
Once again Washington’s Middle East and Gulf policies counter enormous difficulties over Turkey’s national policies, and the pending war in Iraq await Ankara’s approval of the American forces’ deployment in a region around Diyarbakir and transfer to Northern Iraq. Generously fed by the American Disinformation Mechanism, the Turkish media is full of stories about 80-90 thousand American soldiers’ imminent arrival in Turkey and the American utilization of 5-6 Turkish military airbases and 2-3 ports in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea without any need for Ankara’s permission for American military action in Iraq from Turkey.
These press reports are all wrong and the real situation is not a millimetre different from what Pulse wrote exactly a year ago in its article entitled “Turkey’s Crystal Clear Gulf Policy Made Clearer” (turkpulse 60 of December 31st, 2001).
Ankara’s Iraq policy is the same under the Erdogan-Gul team
That fact, for its part, is tantamount to another fact that the Americans have gone into all that trouble in vain in order to topple the Ecevit Government 18 months prematurely.
In the seventies American disinformation used to propagate worldwide that PM Harold Wilson was being investigated for being a KGB spy. Given the fact that the United States did everything in its power to bring Tayyip Erdogan to power after decades of subversive activities for settling the Fetullah Gulen community in Turkish politics, Turkish security authorities were understandably suspicious of the AKP chairman as a possible CIA agent. That is apparently the reason why Erdogan is countering so much difficulty in being a member of parliament, much less prime minister. In the meantime, wheels are turning fast for him to clarify his real position – to act against Turkey’s established foreign policy and security arrangements by tagging after Washington’s demands or choosing to be a Turkish statesman loyal to objective calculations about this country’s national interests. Following a few mistaken statements, which were put down to his lack of experience rather than deliberate deviation from national policies, the AKP Chairman is proving that the suspicions about his CIA links are unjustified.
This, for its part, may mark a major difference between the first Gulf War and today’s Iraq campaign as far as Turkey goes. In the first case, Turkey had a strong ruler, President Turgut Ozal, whose PM Demirel had charged him with treason and whose Deputy PM Inonu was refusing to shake hands with him. It was obvious that after having achieved perfect economic reform in the country for years President Ozal had finally fallen into his family’s trap and lost his capability of ruling as an honest Turkish statesman with the documents of his corruption in foreign intelligence services pockets. Tayyip Erdogan had the signs of being another Ozal with several corruption trials against him and his 4-5 children and relatives receiving education in the USA and UK with mysterious financing resources. All these are, however, common knowledge and Tayyip Erdogan’s strong side may be that he has no reason to fear the revelations of a foreign secret service. That was not the case for Turgut Ozal and Tahsin Sahinkaya and, to a lesser extent, Tansu Ciller, who unwisely said during the latest election campaign that the Americans could wait for the 3 November elections. She would come to power and solve the Iraq problem for the United States, she unwisely claimed.
The Turkish nation’s preference on 3 November was Tayyip Erdogan who found himself in a feverish activity in foreign policy starting with the EU accession, Cyprus and Iraq. With a surprise visit to Moscow a few days ago along with 180 Turkish businessmen, journalists and top bureaucrats as well as two ministers, he chose to add to them Turkey’s relations with Russia and took a number of unexpected steps to improve these relations that the West had been effectively blocking for the last few years. These improvements included winding up the opening up of the Russian consulate in Antalya after five years of toil by Russian diplomats, not admitting into Turkey the Chechen activists whom Ecevit had deported after the terrorism perpetrated in the opera house in Moscow, furthering this secret service cooperation with Russia against Chechen and PKK terrorists, making arrangements to give a boost to economic and tourism cooperation with Russia and institutionalising them in especially the energy and transport sectors as well as embracing the existing cooperation for the defence and security of the region that had been agreed upon during General Kivrikoglu’s time.
Turkish forces in northern Iraq fulfil a defence mission for neighbours
Iraq has an important part in these arrangements which General Kivrikoglu worked out during his Russian counterpart’s official visit to Ankara two years ago and this cooperation boils down to making effective defence and security arrangements with Turkey’s neighbours in forestalling terrorism and ambitions of a UDI by the Kurds or Chechens. Especially this last point greatly compensates the shortfall of Turkey’s Gulf policy a decade ago.
These arrangements with its neighbours - Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Russian Federation include the Turkish armed forces’ taking effective measures in northern Iraq as is explained in the Pulse article a year ago such as forestalling foreign powers from militarising Barzani, Talabani and the PKK relics there, as well as preventing them from having foreign military or air bases in northern Iraq. As the direct implementation of this policy worked out with its neighbours, Turkey today has 15,000 troops and tanks in northern Iraq and even though the media claims that it is there in accordance with American plans, the exact opposite is the case. The New York Times and Hurriyet published last week the photograph of Turkish tanks guarding the Bamerni airfield against foreign intentions to have an air base in Kurdish controlled northern Iraq.
It does not, of course, mean that Turkey has military plans and ambitions for the region at the expense of the Americans. On the contrary, Ankara is doing its utmost to coordinate these plans and arrangements to those of the Americans and that is where the press claims emerge to the effect that Turkey is a part of the imminent American invasion of Iraq.
The principle of legitimacy of the military action against Iraq, that is to say the requirement of a resolution of the UN Security Council enables Turkey to enforce its Gulf policy by eliminating its shortfall during the first Gulf War. In other words, the Turkish forces in Iraq, which are expected to be doubled in size by reaching army corps level, are an assurance of peace in the region, just as a similar force in Cyprus has brought peace to the troubled island for the last quarter of a century. All these healthy developments in international relations of direct concern to Turkey are taking place thanks to the principles adopted by Turkish diplomacy as explained in the Pulse article of September 7th, 2001. ( turkpulse 48 entitled “EU Style Cooperation in Turkey’s Region.”)
As far as Iraq goes, the outcome of this policy will be as written in Pulse of October 22nd, 2000 entitled “Ankara Improves Relations With Iraq With Enormous Strategic Consequences.” ( turkpulse 25.) Turkey’s plan B about the EU’s rebuff to its accession stretches as far away as densely populated Asian countries such as China and India. Fresh signs of this policy will be seen in the New Year. One of the first important steps in this direction will be between 26th and 28th February 2003 when Turkey will host mostly transport ministers from Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, as well as high powered delegations from the United States and important international organisations concerned with transport at the Istanbul Conference for Caspian and Black Sea Transport. uras@ada.net.tr - December 28th, 2002