TURKEY MARCHES TOWARDS NEW MILLENIUM WITH TWO TOP POLITICAL VETERENS

By all indications President Demirel and PM Ecevit will occupy the two top political positions of Turkey in the first half of the next decade. Their half a century experience in Turkey’s race to catch up with the developed world may soon see some vital foreign policy steps. Energy heads the list of the motives that shape this policy. Below is a short article of what should be expected in Turkey under the Demirel-Ecevit team.

The legislation of a constitutional amendment with 423 votes on Friday (18^th) is not only a milestone in Turkey’s political history, but also a significant indicator for political developments in the first decade of the new century.

It is a milestone because this is the first time a civilian parliament has so comfortably passed a constitutional provision on its own accord and initiative. In July 1995 a civilian parliament passed 17 amendments which were the result of ANAP Chairman Mesut Yilmaz’s responsible behaviour as the official opposition leader at that time, although the legislation of the amendments were never as comfortable or thorough as this one. Several provisions of these 17 amendments have still not been enforced because the relevant bills for their implementation have not been passed by Parliament in the past four years.

As for the amendment of Article 143 about removing the military judge from the State Security Courts, the bill for its implementation was ready and has already gone into force with Parliament’s passing it in one day. Thus the last part of the Ocalan trial started on Thursday (23^rd) after a 15-day break for the final defence of the defendant. There will be no military judge in the tribunal at the final verdict stage of the trial.

This will save Turkey from falling out of step with Europe in its modernisation in the new century, the Ocalan trial being only a small part in this radical change in Turkey’s legal system. There are currently 7022 cases in the State Security Courts and they would all have been subject to the European Human Rights Tribunal’s indemnity verdicts against Turkey if it had not amended Article 143.

This amendment achieved so perfectly by the new Parliament exactly two months after the elections is also indicative of the settlement of political stability in Turkey after a decade of constant government crises which greatly harmed the economy. The present Government can now carry out some constitutional amendments and radical political, social and economic reforms, all of which are badly needed in Turkey.

Will other constitutional amendments be as easy?

One of these amendments concerns the last step for political stability in Turkey in the first decade of the new century – the election of the new president upon the expiry of President Demirel’s tour of duty on May 16^th, 2000. PM Ecevit says that the best solution to this problem is the renewal of President Demirel’s mandate for another term, given his enormous political experience and key role in settling the democratic parliamentary system in Turkey in the last 40 years. Yet the Constitution bans a person from becoming president in Turkey for more than once. This provision inserted in the 1982 Constitution by President Kenan Evren to show his loyalty to democratic regime as a president brought to office by a military coup is now a stumbling block in the way of settling political stability at a very critical point of Turkey’s democracy.

There is no political figure in today’s parliament with a stature to follow Demirel as the tenth President of Turkey after May 2000. Bulent Ecevit is not a university graduate and this shortcoming disqualifies him as Demirel’s successor. Devlet Bahceli is simply too new and inexperienced to be considered for this position. Mesut Yilmaz is considered to be a good possibility for this position, but he has some setbacks. Above all, he is determined to clear his name in the Supreme Court concerning eight parliamentary investigation committee reports left from the previous parliament. Whether or not these formalities can be completed by next May is not certain

He has also suffered a serious election failure, if not defeat, by reducing his party’s votes from 19% in 1995 to 13% last April. His political opponents, both within the party and outside, are exploiting this failure against him. As a promising, young politician, Mesut Yilmaz may need to wait for another term to make a bid for the Presidency, even though his succeeding President Demirel in May should never be ruled out as a high probability, if need be.

As for the other two party leaders, Recai Kutan and Tansu Ciller, one cannot even imagine either of them becoming president. This leaves PM Ecevit’s realistic diagnosis of amending the Constitution to allow Demirel a second term in Cankaya. The three coalition partners may well come round to supporting this idea, but they need the DYP’s support for such an amendment. Given the sour relations between Demirel and Tansu Ciller, it is not easy to get this support. After the last elections Tansu Ciller blamed President Demirel as the main reason for her election defeat at his party organs meetings in private. It is, therefore, not easy for the DYP to support such an amendment as long as Ciller is heading the party. Yet, it is not certain that Ciller will survive this nearly one-year period as the DYP Chairperson. She will face the DYP’s national convention on November 20^th now that her opponents in the party have failed to move it forward to July with an emergency convention to discuss the election results. With this manoeuvre she has gained four valuable months to get over the election defeat. This means local DYP congresses until November and she may have a lot of headaches at these meetings. She may well lose the election at the national convention to Necmettin Cevheri. In the meantime, she may be convicted in the Supreme Court for negligence, if not corruption, if the necessary amendments are made to the Constitution about curbing parliamentary immunity. Tansu Ciller’s shaky position in the party prevents her from forestalling these constitutional amendments.

Assuming for a second that she survives all these storms, in May 2000 Tansu Ciller will have the choice of supporting the amendment for the renewal of Demirel’s mandate in Cankaya or having him up against herself as a rival in the DYP. Actually, this is the main trump card of her dissidents in the party for the convention in November. They are trying to curb Ciller’s advantages at congresses as the party chairperson by maintaining that Demirel may lead the party to power if he took over the leadership after his term ends in Cankaya.

This danger may eventually bring Tansu Ciller round to amending the Constitution for a second term for Demirel and it would mean two veteran politicians of Turkey, Suleyman Demirel and Bulent Ecevit leading for the next five years with a very comfortable political stability in the country.

MHP Chairman Devlet Bahceli has so far proved that he will not fall into the opposition’s trap that he should be the Prime Minister with the FP’s and the DYP’s support.

For that reason the claims of discord in the coalition and disagreements between Ecevit and Bahceli are more of the opposition’s wishful thinking than causing any real danger to political stability in the foreseeable future.

Foreign policy will be affected by Turkey’s energy needs

This fact will enable Turkey to take stringent steps in foreign policy as well as domestic affairs and all the conditions are suitable for the DSP Chairman to carry out his intentions in these fields.

The most urgent step in this field will be Turkey’s need to answer its energy needs in the coming decade. President Demirel said at the 33^rd anniversary of the inauguration of the Keban hydro-plant on Sunday (20^th) that Turkey needed to invest $290 billion until 2010 on energy and it means massive foreign capital arrivals in the next decade. Yet foreign investors reject putting their money into Turkey as long as their judicial disputes are subject to trials by the judiciary in Turkey. They insist on international arbitration for possible judicial disputes over these investment contracts, but the Turkish Constitution bans it. So the relevant provision of the Constitution should be amended, but no Government has so far been able to do it, even though competent State organs do not object to it.

The amendment on June 18^th has heartened the coalition to bring this amendment to Parliament without delay and it is now high on the Government’s agenda. If this amendment can be made to the Constitution, several power plants will be built by foreign capital with the BOT (build-operate-transfer) formula. Negotiations are already underway with giant multinational consortiums for the Boyabat dam ($601 million), Konya-Ilgin thermal plant ($804 million), Aliaga fuel oil plant ($897 million), Izmir-Aliaga LPG plant ($600 million), Dilet-Guroluk power plant ($400 million), Izmit Bay passage ($1/3 billion), and Derince container terminal ($210 million).

These are only a few of the big power plants or transmission and pipeline projects on Turkey’s agenda. Much more important than these projects are the natural gas pipeline projects with a basic foreign policy preference for Turkey in the new century.

To put it in a nutshell, the natural gas pipeline from Russia to Turkey via Romania and Bulgaria is being expanded to 14-billion m³/year. The Blue Stream natural gas pipeline from Russia to Turkey to run under the Black Sea has a capacity of 16-billion m³/year. The natural gas pipeline from Iran to Turkey to start operating by May 27^th, 2000 has a 10-billion m³/year capacity, subject to expansion. All these giant projects totalling 40-billion m³/year capacity are bilateral arrangements between Turkey and its two neighbours. The oil and energy multinationals are not involved in these huge financial and energy arrangements of Turkey at any stage of the venture – exploration, production, shipment, refining, or marketing.

The last leg of these natural gas deals, the Turkmen gas from under the Caspian Sea to Turkey via Azerbaijan and Georgia, is an exception. At the Americans’ initiative and insistence, Turkey accepted in 1998 to divert this pipeline away from Iran towards the pipeline under the Caspian for 16-billion m³/year capacity to start with. It will eventually rise to 30-billion m³/year and be shipped to Europe via Turkey.

Now that this project has reached the final stage after 18 months of detailed preparations, there are Washington datelined press reports indicating that the Americans are having second thoughts about this project unless the Blue Stream is cancelled. President Clinton’s Caspian oil and gas envoy Ambassador Morningstar was in Ankara last week denying these press reports and confirming Washington’s allegiance to the Turkmen gas pipeline project. Still it is only expected that this issue will be one of the main determining factors in regulating the Ecevit Government’s relations with the United States, because the oil multinationals hate to see the elimination of their role and share in big international energy exchanges. Turkey being one of the major energy importers of the world in the next century such projects like the Blue Stream is more important for the western world than it is imagined.

Taking this background into account, PM Ecevit is due to visit Washington and Moscow in the following weeks. Due to the differences of opinion on such issues like the Blue Stream, the then PM Mesut Yilmaz was not able to see President Clinton during his visit to the United States last September on the occasion of the UN General Assembly. As Ecevit will be one of Turkey’s two most important political leaders in the next five years, he is sure to be treated more properly in Washington this time. But it should not be expected that Ecevit’s audience for an hour or so with President Clinton would create miracles for Turkey unless other arrangements are made between Ankara and Washington.

Kosovo was a good issue showing the fruits of Turkish-American co-operation and solidarity. If this understanding can be spread to other international issues concerning Turkey’s region – the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucuses and the Gulf - there may be a happier relationship between Turkey and the United States in the period ahead. Otherwise, the current economic problems of Turkey will be more difficult to solve and there may be friction in international issues such as the Cyprus and Aegean problems. Turkey was disenchanted by the G-8’s call for resumption of Cyprus talks "without condition." The Turkish side’s condition continues to be the recognition of the Denktas Administration by the world. In less than a month, the Turks will celebrate the 25^th anniversary of the Turkish landing in Cyprus and Ecevit’s possible visit to the island on that occasion would be an exciting event for the entire region.

The political stability brought to Turkey by the general elections in April is certainly an important factor raising hopes for Turkey to make the most of the possibilities in international relations in the months ahead.  uras@ada.net.tr,  June 23rd, 1999