TIME IS UP - IS CYPRUS OUT OF THE TUNNEL YET?

 

No, it certainly isn’t. On the contrary, it seems to be going into a darker tunnel, if not a longer one, than the one it is about to leave. The first phase of the Cyprus talks intended to be wound up with a final solution by 1 May, passing through three stages, has been suspended without even waiting for the roadmap’s 22 March landmark. Now the second stage will start in Switzerland between Turkey and Greece along with the two Cypriot delegations and after its climax on 29 March, hopefully with the presence of the Turkish and Greek prime ministers as well as the two Cypriot delegations, with Kofi Annan chairing the session, the third and final stage will begin. At this stage the UN Secretary General will give the finishing touches to the conclusions of the previous stages by drawing up the final text. This historic document will be presented for the Turkish and Greek Cypriot peoples’ approvals in referendums on 20 April and the parliaments of the guarantor States will ratify it until 25 April. For the details of the present situation please see the article below.

 The first stage of the Cyprus talks did not even live long enough to see its closure on 22 March, because the Greek Cypriot leader Papadopoulos said there was nothing to give on the part of the Greek Cypriots on the last few days of the “give-and-take”, and because his Turkish Cypriot counterpart Denktas readily announced, after giving an account to the nation of where they were now standing, that he would not attend the second stage talks in Switzerland. This announcement which Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul says he learnt from the TV news forced Ankara to hold a summit on Saturday (20^th) to review and announce once again its “Red Line”. Noteworthy about this summit, which was an attempt to dissuade Denktas from his standoffish decision, was the absence of the summit’s chairman, President Sezer. It was a standoffish move on the part of both Turkish Presidents because while President Denktas was keeping out of the second stage talks he was not boycotting it. He had said PM Talat could head the Turkish Cypriot delegation to the Switzerland talks with full powers. It was a standoffish behaviour on the part of President Sezer too as he was keeping out of the whole affair and also keeping absolutely quiet. Both presidents hope that the Erdogan Government will be successful as Turkey’s and Turkish Cypriots’ national interests so require, but they make it obvious that they are not very optimistic about it.

The results of the first stage, according to Denktas’s revelations

The outcome of the first stage talks in Nicosia were of a nature to prove how too optimistic (not to say “wrong”) Pulse was in its two articles on the Cyprus problem (turkpulse 114 and 115.)

Pulse reported in its previous articles that the Turkish parliament would ratify the final agreement after the referendums of the two Cypriot peoples. Even if the Turkish Cypriot people, in their eagerness to be EU nationals as soon as possible, could vote at the referendum for Annan’s final text, the Turkish parliament could still refuse its ratification. As it now stands the prime ministers of the two countries will, on 9 April, give Kofi Annan letters about the pre-acceptance of the referendum results on 20 April. This is called the Greenland formula as was done by the Norwegian Foreign Minister in the 1930s for a part of Greenland, much to the Norwegian Government’s objections later on. This development is ostensibly against Pulse’s optimism, but it is not, in fact, because no Turkish Prime Minister can possibly give a written assurance to anyone about a document that is not acceptable to the Turkish State. Besides the decision for the ratification of the guarantor States of the final arrangement between 20 and 25 April is still holding good. Nevertheless, it is a negative development to the Turkish optimists’ outlooks, but it is the least important compared to the other setbacks of the first phase talks.

The second catch in the outcome of the first phase talks was about the so-called “derogations,” meaning in EU terminology, “the rule notwithstanding”. In other words, the established free movement and property rules of the EU would not hold good for the TRNC’s new form within the United Republic of Cyprus, at least until the Turkish accession, according to the West’s promises to Ankara. Not only the Greek Cypriots totally rejected these derogations at the Nicosia talks, but the EU representatives did not confirm them either to Denktas for the required period, “until Turkey became a full member”.  He, therefore, now suspects a western plot that will put an end to the Turkish existence in Cyprus within the European integration.

The third disappointment for Denktas concerned the promises made to Turkey by the Americans and Europeans that the EU courts will not pass verdicts against the Turkish Cypriots when the TRNC becomes a part of the EU. This would be done by making the final arrangements a part of the EU’s Prime Law, a kind of the constitution of the European Integration at present. At the Nicosia talks the Greek Cypriots totally rejected it and the EU representatives did not confirm it to Denktas either. It gave the impression to President Denktas that after a while the Americans and Europeans would join hands and virtually kill the successor of the TRNC. He said he could not possibly permit it as it meant the eradication of Turkdom from the island.

The “last straw” that made Denktas’s patience run out was the rejection of the Turkish demand that the Greek Cypriots who will return to the TRNC after the final agreement should use their political rights for the federal government in the Greek sector. This would have ensured the prevention of upsetting the balances in the federal government organs. But that was also turned down.

Even the most pro-reunification member of the TRNC, PM Mehmet Ali Talat was frustrated by these developments and said that the Greek Cypriots were constantly eroding the agreed upon principles by joining hands with the EU Commission.

Does Turkey have any alternatives to EU accession and western alliance?

Some readers of Pulse have remarked that Turkey has no alternatives to the EU accession or western alliance and, in a way, they are absolutely right. The alternative to Turkey’s EU accession and NATO is again EU accession and NATO. In other words, it is “either EU accession or EU accession”.

While this observation and belief is correct, it is not correct to expect that Turkey is doomed to accept whatever the EU or the West offers for the Cyprus solution or the European integration and that it has no other alternative. Accepting a second class relationship for Turkey within the EU membership is even less realistic. When the German opposition leader suggested a “privileged status to Turkey instead of full membership”  only a couple of months ago, PM Tayyip Erdogan did not even ask her what it was and publicly brushed it aside as impossible. A few weeks later Chancellor Schroeder came to Ankara and assured Turkey that such Christian Democratic fantasies did not hold good for the majority of Germans whom he said “would always keep their promises”.  His promise to Turkey was Germany’s support to Turkey’s EU accession.

As for how Turkey can ensure a fair deal in Cyprus, northern Iraq and the European integration, PM Erdogan gave the answer subtly, but it would only take a Turk to understand him. He said, “If Turkey is not admitted into the EU, then the Copenhagen criteria would become Ankara criteria and we would continue on our path.”

What does this mean?

It means Turkey is trying to adapt itself to the Copenhagen criteria not necessarily to please Europe and America, but because democracy is a good thing worthy of the Turkish nation. Even if we found some of these criteria excessive we are still carrying them out. So if the EU does not give Turkey the negotiation status after the Cyprus talks and Turkey’s eighth parcel in the pipeline to conform to the Copenhagen criteria, these democratic rules with some possible alterations and adaptation will be termed the “Ankara criteria” and new partners will be invited to join in. It is true that one can apply these democratic rules to no other Islamic country than Turkey, but there are other powerful countries such as Russia, Ukraine, India which have gone a long distance on the path of democracy and some others are striving to live up to democratic principles.

If Turkey’s relations with them do not now advance as fast as desired it is only because of its customs union with the EU and some restrictions of the western alliance. The moment they are pushed aside the mutual and possibly multilateral cooperation would make headlong progress and it may be a two- or three-speed speed cooperation for less democratic countries, as the European integration is today.

With or without these drastic developments in Turkey’s general world orientation, Russia is already on the path of being Turkey’s biggest economic partner in several fields before long. President Putin’s State visit to Turkey may be a turning point in this respect especially if the West attempts to play a trick on Turkey about its promises on Cyprus and a resultant slowing down in Turkey’s EU accession.

At the moment both a Cyprus solution by 1 May and the continuation of the accession process to the European integration enjoy the highest priority in Turkey’s foreign policy designs. It is highly improbable that developments in the second and especially the third stages of the Cyprus talks will upset this course of Turkey’s foreign policy developments.  uras@ada.net.tr – March 22^nd, 2004