The second stage of the current Ecevit Government started last week with ANAP Chairman Mesut Yilmaz’s assignment as the Deputy PM in charge of EU affairs. The first stage of this tripartite coalition, covering just over a year between its formation following the general elections in April 1999 and July 13^th, 2000 when Yilmaz entered the Cabinet, was a promising success story barring the last few weeks before the parliamentary recess when ANAP and the MHP fell out over the investigation committee reports. However, the developments over the MHP’s unexpected moves against its coalition partner, Mesut Yilmaz, were, in a way, a godsend for Turkey in that they opened the eyes of the Prime Minister and the State agencies in charge of national security about the continuing influence of external forces on the MHP. This, for its part, is bound to greatly influence the developments of Turkish politics in the second stage ahead.

Mesut Yilmaz’s presence in the coalition as one of the top three was of no surprise to Pulse readers as this publication had, for the last two months, been giving accurate information about it and its consequences (issue no:16 Feverish Work and issue no:17 Backbone of Government) when no one was aware of these developments in the pipeline.

As for the course of future developments and the expectations for the future, the key is clearly whether the Ecevit-Yilmaz solidarity will continue. Both PM Ecevit and his Deputy Yilmaz are confident, after three years of cooperation to govern Turkey, that this solidarity has been tested under very critical conditions and proved to be rock solid, despite internal and external efforts to provoke them against one another. The MHP’s ever-prominent appearance as a different kind of political party is further consolidating this solidarity and making them forget about their relatively small differences.

A notable case in point was the EU’s Helsinki summit last December when Turkey was officially accepted as a candidate to the EU in contravention of the Luxembourg rebuff two years earlier. ANAP’s ex-State Minister in charge of the EU, Mehmet Ali Irtemcelik, was instrumental in securing this good result for Turkey, while Foreign Minister Ismail Cem tended to reject the EU’s Helsinki proposals. When the press reported the details of these differences, however, PM Ecevit approached Mesut Yilmaz to remove Irtemcelik from EU affairs. Even though ANAP was in the right in this affair, Yilmaz complied without any fuss. He also secured Irtemcelik’s silence about his resignation until the new president was elected.

The law that was passed before parliamentary recess and took force on July 4^th, 2000 has founded a special secretariat for EU affairs with 76 staff members headed by an ambassador. It is directly attached to the Prime Minister who has delivered his powers to Mesut Yilmaz. Thus the most important task of the Government about adjusting Turkey’s national legislation to that of the EU now comes under Mesut Yilmaz who will give effect to the Copenhagen criteria in Turkey. The Turkish Permanent Delegate to the United Nations, Ambassador Volkan Vural, has been assigned as the head of this secretariat. Both Ecevit and Yilmaz dismiss claims that these developments are a blow to Foreign Minister Cem and that there will be further friction in the government over this affair.

While this is the case on the Ecevit-Yilmaz front of the coalition, the MHP Chairman, Devlet Bahceli’s relations with the other two are very different. It was Mesut Yilmaz who saved the MHP and the tripartite coalition from breaking up at Bahceli’s tête-à-tête with Yilmaz, when they fell out with Ecevit over the question of executing the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, about a year ago. At Yilmaz’s mediation between the other two, the three leaders finally agreed that the execution of Ocalan should not be carried out until the European Human Rights Committee passes its verdict about Ocalan’s lawyers’ application against Turkey. This decision saved Turkey’s relations with the EU and returned the coalition from the brink of collapse, but the same problem is still hanging fire over the coalition.

Amnesty to prisoners is another disputed point between Ecevit and Bahceli. The MHP wants amnesty for certain notorious Grey Wolves such as Haluk Kirci while standing in the way of easing the heavy penalties of the controversial Article 312 of the Penal Code for allegedly provoking religious, racist or secessionist hatred among the people. Haluk Kirci was the Grey Wolf in the seventies that raided the house of seven medical faculty students preparing for exams and riddled them with bullets from a machine gun, thereby killing them all because they were left wingers. He was sentenced to death seven times by the court, but this confirmed court verdict was never carried out due to the EU’s objection to the capital penalty. In 1991 Parliament passed a bill reducing the death sentences of these political murders to 10 years of imprisonment. Should Kirci now serve seven times 10 years for his seven death penalties or only 10 years as “a person can be executed only once” is one of the soar points between Ecevit and Bahceli over the amnesty question. There are other similar discrepancies and huge differences between Ecevit and Bahceli and this time Mesut Yilmaz’s mediation in favour of the MHP is nowhere around. On the contrary, he has come to the conclusion that Turkey can never carry out the Copenhagen criteria unless the MHP drops its notorious Grey Wolf mentality. Yilmaz has said in so many words that the MHP would lose its unjustly gained strength when the human rights demands of the EU are answered within the Copenhagen Criteria (see the last issue of Pulse), and now he is in charge to carry it out.

This brings us to the question of the solidarity and durability of the Ecevit Government, in particular, and the political stability of Turkey under the existing parliamentary arithmetic, in general.

In theory, the MHP may break away from the Government and form a Cabinet in coalition with the FP with the DYP’s support or participation. And what is more, such a formula would make Devlet Bahceli the Prime Minister as the biggest party of the coalition. Tansu Ciller did dangle this seductive alternative before Bahceli’s nose in a desperate attempt to prevent the formation of the present tripartite coalition, but Bahceli proved to be too wise to be enticed by such nonsense. He still knows that the MHP’s existence as a ruling power rests with the present coalition formula.

What if he changes his mind and attempts to return to Ciller’s seductive formula? It would simply be political suicide for the MHP. The rule and tradition in Turkey is: “Hukumet olabilirsin, fakat Iktidar olamazsin” (You can be the Government, but you cannot be the Ruling Power), unless you conform to Turkey’s “State policies” and the “unchangeable” qualities of the Republic defined by Article 2 of the Constitution.

Erbakan’s and Ciller’s premierships, Ozal’s presidency especially towards his last years in Cankaya, Air Force Commander General Tahsin Sahinkaya’s position as one of the five commanders ruling Turkey in the 12 September interregnum are all cases in point. And their outcomes are common knowledge. Today Turkey is waging a tough fight in order to bring down a high inflation rate that has been pestering the country for the last two decades. It cannot risk pouring these efforts down the drain by trying out another such Government under Bahceli.

The EU’s demands of Turkey in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria are compiled in three groups -to improve human rights, ensure the stability of democratic institutions and respect minority rights. If these improvements are made in the Turkish legislation the talks for accession to the EU as a full member will start in 2004.

Though Ankara has already covered a long distance in complying with these criteria, it admits that there is still a lot to do in all these three categories. There are also limits, however.

For instance, the military judges in State Security Tribunals have already been removed with a constitutional amendment. The West’s objection to the role of the military in Turkey is largely exaggerated and unacceptable. The military never interferes in daily politics, but only sees to the preservation of the qualities of the Republic – “a democratic, secular and social State ruled by law and loyal to human rights and Ataturk nationalism”. But what if the EU still insists on curbing the NSC’s powers or bringing the Defence Minister before the Chief of the General Staff in Turkish protocol?

Some symbolic changes to satisfy the West are possible, but curbing the security forces’ influence in determining and enforcing the State policy in Turkey is not. The Armed Forces are the most respected institution and safeguard the nation’s independence and security in Turkey. Innumerable questionnaires, Gallup Polls and surveys carried out by the US and the EU among all walks of life in Turkey confirm this fact. To introduce some European rules in Turkey in a way to undercut the State agencies’ powers is simply unacceptable to the Turkish nation even if it means remaining out of the EU.

Likewise, minority rights are respected in Turkey. Greek, Armenian and Jewish communities admittedly live comfortably and freely in accordance with the Lausanne Treaty’s definition of minorities. To enlarge this definition in order to include the Kurds as a minority is simply not possible from Ankara’s angle. The EU’s commissioner for accession to the Union, Gunther Verheugen, was in Ankara last week making contacts about minority rights and other demands of the EU for Turkey’s accession. He was told in Ankara that the Basques in Spain and Corsicans in France are not treated as minorities in EU documents. Neither the UN Charter nor the Council of Europe conventions contain such minority obligations for accession. The Amsterdam Convention of the EU does not mention it either. Only the Copenhagen criteria bring up the minority rights question and this point is bound to be the toughest bargaining point at the talks ahead.

Turkey’s tendency is to let Kurdish be spoken, broadcast and probably even taught in some private schools, not as a minority right, but as a human rights issue of the individual. The Higher Board of Human Rights under State Minister Rustu Kazım Yucelen has already prepared a report entitled “Measures to Be Taken in the Light of the Copenhagen Criteria”. While Ecevit described this report as “Far above the EU’s expectations”, Verheugen said it was a good start, but not enough. The concept of “Comprehensive Constitutional Citizenship” of that report accords certain facilities to the Kurds in Turkey such as broadcasts in their own language and teaching this language as an individual’s right, but not as a minority right.

Mesut Yilmaz is the representative of the liberal outlook in this regard, while the MHP represents the diehard conservative outlook. The EU will present its draft to Turkey in September for the basis of these talks until 2004 following Verheugen’s soundings in Ankara last week. Before the end of the year, Turkey will present to the EU its counter proposals to this draft called “Accession Partnership Document” and hopefully both sides will get down to brass tacks for working out Turkey’s accession agreement as from the new year. PM Ecevit believes that the talks for accession will be finalised much earlier than is thought.