NORTHERN IRAQ IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SYRIAN ACCORDS

PKK migrates to Northern Iraq after Turkey and Syria agree to oust terrorists. The Washington agreement with Kurdish leaders meets with difficulties from the first day and the PKK migration further confuses the arrangements. Ankara’s suspicion of a Federal Kurdish State in Northern Iraq with American support accelerates its implementation of policies towards Syria, Iraq and Iran. Will a new formation emerge in the region as a result of these activities? If so, what impact will it have on developments in the region?

About 200 PKK militants made up of small groups migrated from their camps in Syria to northern Iraq between October 16^th-19^th, just before Turkey and Syria signed the Special Security Agreement in Adana on October 20^th. The militants included 15 chieftains of the terrorist organization. It is not clear if they figure among the list of hundreds of PKK members whose names Syria handed to Turkey, according to the Adana Accords.

These 200 militants were settled in the Zeli camp on the Iranian border and other camps in the Zap valley, if one may use the word “settle” for these always-on-the-move militiamen. The PKK’s funds, financed by the contributions of its side organizations in Europe and profits from drug smuggling, are still in Syrian banks. The Syrian economy will meet with difficulties if the PKK withdraws this money, it is reported.

Additional problems emerge for Northern Iraq from the Adana Accords

The transfer of the PKK’s illegal terrorist camps and headquarters from Syria to Northern Iraq is causing additional difficulties for the success of the Washington Accords reached by Kurdish tribal chiefs Massoud Barzani and Jelal Talabani. The KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party) led by Barzani is basically against the PKK because its lifeline is the transit trade with Turkey through the Habur Bridge on the Turkish-Iraqi frontier. The PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) headed by Talabani, on the other hand, has so far been the main shelter that harbours and supports PKK terrorists.

That is why it is not easy to achieve the harmonious peaceful co-existence of these two Kurdish tribes, much less their cooperation. Turkey’s suspicion of the Washington Accords may simply make them inoperable, even though it is still too early to speak about the future implementation.

The State Department has been careful about not calling the Washington arrangements with the Kurdish leaders a pact, agreement or Accords. At the ceremony for its announcement in Washington on September 17^th, Secretary of State Albright called them a “Joint Statement” or “timetable”. It was apparently due to the Americans’ wish to show these arrangements as a continuation of the 1996 Ankara Accords rather than a separate agreement without Turkish participation.

Ankara is against it whether “Federal” or “Federative”

As for the Turkish Government, it is in two minds about these arrangements, the weight being on the objection side mostly because it sees them as paving the way for a federal Kurdish State when the time comes. (Issue No:55, Turkey Views Kurdish Arrangements in Washington as Temporary).

Here too American diplomats emphasize that the Washington arrangements do not specify a federal Kurdish Government, but mentions a “federative” system as a possibility.

The Turkish side is not sure what “federative” means. The term used in Turkish is “federal government” for the central administration of a federal system and “federated states” for its affiliates. Probably in American English “federative” is the same thing as “federated” in Turkish. Even then it takes two to tango. How can you have a federated or federative state when there is no federal government or at least a second federated state?

There is only one example of it in history - Denktaş. The Turkish Cypriot Administration called itself the “Federated Turkish State of Cyprus” between February 13^th, 1975 after the Turkish landing in Cyprus in July 1974 and the proclamation of independence on November 15^th, 1983. It was the laughing stock of the Greeks with no federal or any other federated state in existence. They used to call it the “pseudo state” The proclamation of independence was unavoidable after nine years of patience on the part of the Turks.

Now Ankara suspects that if the Kurds in Northern Iraq achieve a united and functioning administration with its capital in Erbil, enjoying a separate government, parliament and judiciary, the territorial integrity of Iraq will disappear in no time. It will not be long before the Kurdish Administration will proclaim independence whether it is called federal, federative, federated or anything else and there will be instant worldwide recognition, the reason being that there is a superpower behind it all and enormous oil interests of the multinationals are involved.

Otherwise, the Washington Accords do contain certain constructive points for Turkey such as confirming that the provinces of Dohuk, Sulaimaniye and Erbil are inseparable parts of the State of Iraq. Also, the parties to the Washington arrangements are charged with preventing terrorists from violating these frontiers. The agreement also contains express provisions against harbouring or sheltering the PKK or tolerating any other infiltration into Turkey or Iran by subversive elements.

Now the PKK militants’ migration to Northern Iraq from Syria will be a factor against these provisions if that place eventually turns out to be a centre for planning, organizing, financing and harbouring these terrorists. As the Barzani section of Northern Iraq is allegedly swarming with Turkish officials (Jelal Talabani even talks of the invasion of the Turks), it is easier for Ankara to monitor and prevent these activities than when they were being run from Damascus.

Even before the Turkish-Syrian Accords, Barzani’s Peshmerges (soldiers) started the biggest military operation of recent years against the PKK at the end of September to deliver it deadly blows in its region, especially near the Turkish and Iranian frontiers. In an attempt to enter the transitional Kurdish Parliament that will hold its first session in Erbil on January 1^st, 1999, pending the elections next summer under the Washington arrangements, the PKK offered Barzani peace and stopped its attacks on the KDP. Determined to eliminate the PKK from the region, however, the KDP responded by starting an offensive against it. This offensive was in coordination with the military operation the Turkish Armed Forces were carrying out in Eastern Anatolia near and to the south of the Van area. It is because Ankara hates politicizing the PKK issue, just as strongly as it has been fighting against this terrorism for 15 years.

The difficulties encountered in power sharing and revenue sharing 

According to the Washington timetable for power sharing and revenue sharing, the KDP should have agreed by October 1^st to transfer to the PUK part of its revenue from Habur. It has not been achieved so far.

Another point in the American timetable is the commencement on October 15^th of the return home of the displaced people in Northern Iraq. In August 1996 Barzani forces joined hands with Baghdad and captured Erbil from Talabani’s forces. The reshuffle in the administration and migration of population this military operation caused in the city will now be rectified if the relevant provision of the Washington agreement goes into force.

Again it entails the exchange of population, restoration of properties and compensation to the displaced people. Subcommittees composed of the two Kurdish groups are now working on these points making slow progress.

According to the timetable, the two Kurdish groups will visit Ankara in the first week of November to have consultations on these arrangements. Before that, on October 27^th, the National Security Council met in Çankaya under President Demirel to review all these developments in the light of the agreement with Syria, the escape of Abdullah Öcalan to Moscow and migration of the PKK headquarters from Damascus to Northern Iraq. These decisions of the NSC (National Security Council) will probably be the determining factor in the future implementation of the Washington agreement and its timetable.

Turkey is not only against the PKK’s military presence, but is also greatly disturbed by the West’s trying to gain worldwide acceptance of its political identity with such arrangements as the PKK parliament in Rome. To counter these moves Ankara is stepping up cooperation with the countries of the region.

New formation and cooperation in the region

Fresh talks with Baghdad are part of these initiatives. At the height of the Turkish-Syrian crisis, State Minister Mehmet Batallı was in Baghdad having talks with Iraq’s second strong man, Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan. The Iraqi Government urged Turkey to have cordial relations with Baghdad devoid of external powers’ influence. Otherwise, Ramadan warned Batallı, the mutual interests of the two countries would be sacrificed for the selfish interests of outside forces. Iraq seemed willing “to open up new vistas in mutual relations, by restoring historic ties between the two nations.”

Deputy PM Bülent Ecevit believes that the PKK would be a bigger headache for Turkey if it settled in Northern Iraq after it had to leave Syria because of the American factor there. He told Bilal Çetin of Yeni Yüzyıl (9^th), “Even though the United States is not aiming to found a (Kurdish) State there (in Northern Iraq), it is dragging the matter in that direction with its latest initiatives. Under these conditions, the PKK’s weight in Northern Iraq will increase as it has an advanced military force.”

Asked if Turkey would have warmer relations with Iraq under these conditions, Ecevit said, “We are trying to keep relations warm. In order to resume a dialogue we raised our diplomatic relations from charge d’affaires to ambassador level. Our relations would have been next to nil if we had not done so.”

Iraq should realize, emphasizes Ecevit, that there is no country today other than Turkey that puts down its weight for Iraq’s territorial integrity. “Recently they (Iraq) have begun to engage in relations with the PKK with petty calculations. It is a disquieting development, but as I said it is a short-sighted sentimental reaction. The PKK is a secessionist organization which means trouble for them too. It aims at detaching lands from four countries of the region, primarily Iraq, and founding a state there.”

Ecevit further said that the PKK has realized that it can get nowhere through terrorism. It is trying to appear as a political and civilian organization with the so-called “Kurdish Parliament” which it recently convened in Rome. “It is trying to politicize the matter with the help of the West. And that is where the risk starts for Turkey. That is why a new situation has now appeared and it has evoked the irritation of both the public and the Armed Forces,” he said.

A former American Ambassador to Ankara, Morton Abramowitch, told a Turkish journalist in Washington that “Turkey’s tendency to accept the Saddam regime is a basic difference of approach between the United States and Turkey.”

An American political analyst, Alan Makovsky says that it is not feasible for Turkey and the United States to successfully implement their independent policies in Iraq. “It is impossible for the USA to successfully carry out its Iraq policy by seeking international support without securing Turkey’s support,” he affirms.

No doubt the reverse is also true for Turkey. It cannot succeed in its Iraq policies without the United States.

That is exactly why, following the latest Washington arrangements, Turkey has chosen to raise its diplomatic relations with Iraq to ambassadorial level and improvements have begun in mutual relations. Iraq was going to send its Oil Minister Amir Rashid to Ankara for the 75^th anniversary celebrations on October 29^th. Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan may now come in his place in view of improving relations.

Also to offset the USA’s weight, the tripartiteTurkey-Iran-Syria foreign ministers’ meetings may be restored. During these regular consultations between 1993 and 1995 Turkey felt the declined influence of the PKK both in Eastern Turkey and Northern Iraq. But when Syria resumed subversive activity, Turkey called off these regular meetings two years ago. After the Adana Accords, Tehran has again taken the initiative to resume these tripartite consultations and Iraq may join in in the course of time, but the Syrian answer to Iran’s initiative is not yet known.

Amidst this turmoil, Turkey is trying to realize the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project, despite the American oil companies, by pulling the new Central Asian Republics into this multilateral Great Game for the 21^st century. uras@ada.net.tr, October 28^th, 1998