In an interview to the reputable daily Milliyet, the late President Turgut Ozal said some time before his death in April 1993 that he would have made great gains for Turkey with his foreign policy during the Gulf War, but alas “The Mulkiye junta in the Foreign Ministry does not let my hands free.”

“Mulkiye” is Turkey’s 144-year old Faculty of Political Science in Ankara patterned after France’s modern institutions and adopted by the Ottoman Empire during its modernization drive and efforts in the mid 19^th century to train the Empire’s civil servants. Ten years after the foundation of the Republic in 1923 it was moved from Istanbul to Ankara and in 1950 it was attached to Ankara University when there were only three universities in Turkey.

Mulkiye graduates have traditionally guided and operated the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs and Finance for 15 decades now, though the graduates of other universities, now numbering over 70 in Turkey, are gradually putting an end to this monopoly. Even now most of Turkey’s governors, ambassadors and other top bureaucrats and Government members are Mulkiyeli who traditionally maintain a very close solidarity.

President Ozal’s complaint about the “Mulkiye Junta in the MFA” concerns the “Kirkuk event”.

In the late sixties when Washington’s protégé Iran was at odds with the Soviet-backed Iraq in the Gulf, the Shah’s son-in-law and foreign minister Zahedi made a sudden appearance in Istanbul to have a top secret private meeting with his Turkish counterpart, Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil. Zahedi had up his sleeves an unexpected project unprecedented to that day. He told Caglayangil that Iraq was an artificially created State composed of Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen racially and Sunnis and Shiites religiously. Why didn’t Turkey invade the oil rich Kirkuk with its dense Turkmen population as part of the disintegration of this artificially created country by the imperialists at the end of WW I? Iran and the United States would support Turkey in this venture, promised the Shah’s envoy. Surprised, Caglayangil rejected the suggestion off hand, but Zahedi was patient enough to wait in Istanbul for him to go to Ankara and come back with the Government’s final answer. It was to no avail, however, as the answer was a firm confirmation of the refusal of such an adventure.

More than two decades later, President Ozal had this American project in his pocket trying to sell it to the Turkish Government during the Gulf War. This time Washington was publicly supporting the idea as a joint Turkish-American initiative through such semi-official figures like Paul Henze, the CIA’s station chief in Turkey for decades. Even though he had then retired, the American principle was well known in Ankara – “Once intelligence, always intelligence” and his Rome datelined statement to the AP on this point was taken as Washington’s offer to Turkey, but was ignored.

The Turkish General Staff (TGS) was categorically against an adventure in Kirkuk from the military angle, and General Necip Torumtay went as far as resigning from the position of Chief, TGS, over this matter when President Ozal and the blindly pro-American officials in Turkey began to manoeuvre to pass it through Parliament.

The main force to support the top commanders in their opposition of the invasion of Kirkuk by Turkey and the United States was what Ozal called the “Mulkiye Junta in the MFA”, and this joint force carried the day in the end much to the President’s frustration.

One of the Mulkiyelis in charge of Turkish diplomacy at that time in his capacity as the Under-Secretary of the MFA first and then as Turkish Ambassador to Washington, Sukru Elekdag, wrote in Milliyet last Monday (14^th) that the Iraqi leader Saddam was standing firmly in total control of his country today despite all the pressure and embargo of the USA and the UK. “…Again with this aim (to topple Saddam), the Americans and the British are bombing Iraq with jets and Cruise missiles. These operations executed without the approval of the United Nations can be described as totally high-handed. In this context, I should stress that part of these bombings are carried out from the North by the aircraft deployed in Incirlik within the North Watch Operation and they create an exceedingly disturbing situation for Turkey.” Retired Ambassador Elekdag further notes that France will launch a proposal in the United Nations after the American presidential elections for lifting the embargo on Iraq and says, “In my opinion, Turkey should also take part in this initiative and be very active for abolishing the embargo.”

Ambassador Elekdag’s article is a good indicator of what to expect of Turkey over the prospective Gulf and Iraq developments after the American presidential election in November. There is one thing that should be noted in his article, however, that Elekdag apparently talks of the Cruise missiles from the South because from the North there is no such possibility. Ankara has not allowed the United States to deploy medium- and long-range Cruise or Pershing II missiles in Incirlik or any other part of Turkey, despite all efforts by Washington for decades.

An even more important figure from Mulkiye in these foreign policy and security issues is retired Ambassador Ilter Turkmen who served as the Foreign Minister of Turkey during the 12 September interregnum, from 1980 to 1983.

The Turkmen diplomacy characterized itself as “foreign policy with personality”. Very important and daring foreign policy steps were taken, disregarding Washington’s preferences, even though it was not an objection to the Americans for the sake of satisfying one’s ego with an inferior complex, as is the case with dictators such as Saddam, Qadhafi and the Mullahs in Iran today. Rather it was a policy re-orientation in the light of a decades long “troubled alliance” between Turkey and the United States that had gone as far as a military embargo on Turkey between 1975 and 1978 and still continuing in more subtle ways in the early eighties.

As a basically pro-American diplomat who has served all his life for NATO solidarity, FM Ilter Turkmen took three major foreign policy decisions in the early eighties, much to the chagrin of the Americans, concerning Cyprus, the Middle East and the Gulf questions.

• On November 15^th, 1983 President Denktas proclaimed UDI (“U” standing for “Universal” and not “Unilateral”) with Turkey’s planning and full support. Even though no country other than Turkey has recognized it in its 17 years of background, it was a very shrewd foreign policy decision by the Mulkiye team of the MFA led by Ilter Turkmen. The Cyprus crisis is bound to be wound up according to Ankara’s plans sooner or later because these plans are based on the MFA’s long-term calculations and objective criteria, taking into account the outlooks and interests of all the parties concerned with the Cyprus crisis, as well as those of the superpowers and blocs. At the proclamation of the UDI, Foreign Minister Turkmen summed up these principles as follows: (***) “The independence does not necessarily mean that the island will remain divided forever and that they (the Turkish Cypriots) are determined not to unite with any State unless it is a federation with the Greek Cypriots.” (***) “The good offices mission of the UN Secretary-General for a negotiated solution between the two sides will continue.” (***) “No other policy but that of non-alignment will be followed and that the 1960 Treaties of Establishment, Guarantee and Alliance will continue to remain binding.” (***) The secret the Turkish Foreign Minister kept to himself upon this announcement was that in the eyes of the Turks (at least at that time) the UK no longer figured as a guarantor State in Cyprus because London had disqualified itself by not fulfilling its guarantor responsibilities hitherto and announcing that any agreement acceptable to the Turkish and Greek Cypriots was acceptable to London. (***) That is why Denktas and Ankara insisted at the pursuing inter-communal talks under the auspices of the UN that the domestic status of the Cyprus problem should be separated from its international status and that agreement should first be reached on the first point. (***) Because of this secrecy surrounding Ilter Turkmen’s announcement, the agreement reached between the two sides in December 1985, thanks to Washington and London’s help, for the solution of the domestic status of Cyprus was discarded by the Greek Cypriots at the last minute. While Denktas was in New York to sign the agreement, his Greek Cypriot counterpart did not turn up for the meeting. Instrumental was an analysis of the situation by Pulse (which was dissatisfied by the land concessions given by the Turkish side) from which the Anglo-Americans learnt that the British bases could be dismantled in the second stage of the agreement concerning the international status of the new Federal Cyprus. This realization resulted in the withdrawal of their support of this agreement and the Greek Cypriot absence in the signature ceremony. (***) Today the whole world has come round to the aims of the 1983 UDI, that is a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal Cyprus, but the Turkish side demands an agreement between two equal and independent States with the recognition of the UDI first. It is because the Greek Cypriots’ application for full membership to the European Union and its acceptance by the West goes against the principle of non-alignment of the UDI. The principles established by the Turkmen team in 1983 being very realistic, objective and coherent, the Turkish side is bound to have the upper hand in the end.
• The second main step the Mulkiye team took in Ilter Turkmen’s period was to remain loyal to NATO and the EEC (today’s EU), but to have a distinct Turkish policy for its own region that remains outside the Western Alliance. According to this “foreign policy with personality”, the following steps were taken by the Mulkiye team:

(***) In November 1980 diplomatic relations with Israel were reduced to second secretary level, much to Washington’s severe opposition. The natural follow-up of this vital step was to recognize Palestine as an independent State. This was done and a Palestinian Embassy was founded in Ankara, but despite all the intentions and announcements of the Arabs, there was no independent Palestinian State in sight and even the Arab States were not as daring as Turkey in this policy. Neither was Arafat appreciative enough to take such steps as recognizing Denktas’s UDI, but continued to flirt with the Greek Cypriots. So both the steps about Israel and Palestine proved to be misguided, at least in the short run and even medium term, but they were basically sound decisions that had to be taken at any cost to save Turkey from being a country going in the wake of Washington, with no national personality. About the setbacks observed in this policy due to lack of unity, solidarity or any strength on the part of the Arabs, Ankara has made revisions to this plan and raised, since 1992, the relations with Israel to today’s strategic cooperation level, without upsetting the Arabs too much. (issue No: 38  “Turkish-Israeli relations diversified at surprising speed and volume). Besides, these steps taken two decades ago have greatly relaxed Turkish diplomacy today because if Arafat finally decides to proclaim independence on September 13^th, as he intends to do with a 20-year delay, Turkish recognition and diplomatic relations are already established with a Palestinian Embassy in Ankara for more than 10 years. At last week’s contacts in Ankara by Arafat, the Israeli Domestic Security Minister Ben Ami and the American Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East Edward Walker, the United States and Israel urged Turkey to refrain from attempting to play an active role as a mediator between Barak and Arafat. If Turkey had not had the experience about the lack of strength and solidarity on the part of the Arabs, Ankara could well disregard this request and offer its mediation with its centuries long experience of Ottoman rule over the holy lands of Jerusalem up to the end of WWI. Now the most Turkey will do about these developments is play a facilitator’s role for the final agreement. It includes inducing Arafat to postpone the proclamation of independence until after the American elections in November.

(***) Another vital foreign policy re-orientation made by the Ilter Turkmen team concerned the Islamic world and the Gulf. Within this context, Turkey participated in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) summits at presidential level for the first time and President Evren undertook the chairmanship of ISEDAC, the economic committee. Turkey has organized regular meetings of the committee in Istanbul every year. The 20 years that have since passed have proved that these efforts and initiatives within ambitious action plans prepared by Turkey were nothing but a waste of time, because neither the poor Islamic countries got any benefit, nor the rich ones like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other oil producers made any significant contributions to them. Turkey was not even handed over the Secretary General position at the last foreign ministers meeting of the OIC in Kuala Lumpur last June. Instead, with an irrational Arab cronyism backed by Iran’s Mullahs and poor countries that cannot go against Washington’s wishes such as Bangladesh, tiny Morocco was elected to that position for the second time even though it was Asia’s turn to take over. Not the least disheartened by this illogical disfavour of its Islamic colleagues, Turkey is now working for a reform of the religion by discarding unorthodox superstitions of Islam, discriminating against women etc. This new policy will show its impact in the region before long. Turkey will energetically fight against the Taliban fanaticism by supporting General Dostum in Afghanistan more strongly. It will also be more active in central Asia particularly against the recent religious terrorist actions in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The Islamic countries of the former Soviet Union may be Turkey’s main supporters in this new move of reforming Islam and the OIC. To be able to secure it, Ankara may have to make some alterations to its previous mistakes in this policy by such rulers like Tansu Ciller. These alterations may prove to especially President Islam Kerimov of Uzbekistan that Turkey has not harboured religious fundamentalists who made attempts on his life. The President’s adversary Muhammed Salih lived in Turkey between 1993 and 1997 allegedly plotting these fundamentalist activities and assassination attempts against Kerimov, with the help of another dissident, Tahir Memengani, and the Uzbek students in Turkey. Did Ciller and Erbakan engage in such illegal activities against the State policy of Turkey when they were in power, as Ciller attempted to kill President Aliyev in April 1995 is not certain, but Turkey definitely has no such policies against the Turkic republics. President Kerimov will realize these facts better with Turkey’s new policies towards Central Asia. When PM Ecevit was in Oslo last June, Muhammed Salih, who is in exile there now, tried to see him with MHP Deputy Chairman Bulent Yahnici’s mediation, but at the MFA’s recommendations this was forestalled lest relations with Uzbekistan became impasse once again. The former President of Azerbaijan, Ebulfez Elchibey, told a press conference in London last April that Turkey and Azerbaijan should form a confederation, but such extremist policies are not part of Turkey’s new foreign policy orientations about Eurasia. They are rather Washington-guided policies that do not stand much chance of success in Turkey mostly because of the scientific and long-term planning of the Military and Mulkiye graduates in the government mechanism, if nothing else.