PULSE of TURKEY No 48.................SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 6^th 1998

“Turkey is no longer just an outpost or a flank country of NATO. It is a regional power with a say in the developments of the world, especially in its own region.” These words by a Minister in charge of foreign policy affairs, Ahad Andican, is the best explanation for certain big differences of foreign policy between Ankara and Washington in recent years.

Luckily with the experience of the last four, five decades, both sides have now learnt how to bridge their differences and use their skill of meeting halfway without giving up crucial points.

One can recount several important international events and problems of recent years as proof of this. For instance, the Washington plan and eventually the Dayton Accord for the solution of the Bosnia tragedy was a product of the American Government’s appreciation of the validity of Turkey’s grievances. In the West it was the United States that first agreed with Turkey’s argument, “What was the Second World War fought for if Hitler’s war crimes are going to be repeated 50 years later in the heart of Europe before the eyes of the whole world?” That was how a thorny question could be brought to a partial settlement by discarding the Serbs’ “ethnical cleansing”. Even though the credit went to the Americans for this humane development it was Turkey which worked hard for the protection of the Muslim population of the former Yugoslav Federation. Similar developments are unrolling even today in Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania, i.e. in the Balkans in general. Again Turkish-American fair play in foreign issues is an assurance for the prevention of the recurrence of Bosnia tragedies in these places, at least in previous dimensions.

Middle East issues for Turkish-American cooperation 

Several arrangements in the Middle East especially concerning Washington’s “dual containment” policy in Iran and Iraq are other examples of the capability of Turkey and the United States to make mutual sacrifices to iron out their differences.

This wise policy has been working since the end of the cold war, but so is the disenchantment or even suspicions of each side for the other.

For instance, the vital differences of Turkey and the USA over the “Kurdish problem” could eventually be brought to the point of a consensus called the “Ankara process,” but in the heart of its heart neither side is sure of the other side’s intentions. Consequently, Washington has reluctantly put up with Turkey’s military incursions in Northern Iraq to suppress the PKK terrorism in recent years. Likewise, Ankara has always gazed with suspicion at Washington’s efforts to, step by step, create a Kurdish State in Northern Iraq.

Now that Washington has taken fresh initiatives to bring the Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani tribes together for a single Kurdish Administration in Northern Iraq, Ankara is feeling uneasy over the possibility of an eventual Kurdish UDI in the region as a result of these steps.

Naturally, this suspicion ensues that Turkey is making preparations and using its influence diametrically opposed to the USA. This being a vital national unity and territorial integrity question for Turkey there is not much room for Ankara’s give-and-take in this issue either.

If there is to be any flexibility in the Kurdish issue between Ankara and Washington it is bound to be on the part of the Americans. Indeed, that is how the “Ankara Process” came into existence. But now that the UN sanctions on Iraq are expiring with already great relaxation in practice, the Ankara process apparently does not satisfy Washington anymore.

The State Department’s initiative to bring Barzani and Talabani together in Washington resulted in the MFA’s (Ministry of Foreign Affairs’) counter initiatives to host Barzani in Ankara on his way to the United States. Barzani visited Ankara between September 2^nd and 5^th and held consultations with Bülent Ecevit, Ismail Cem, the Speaker Hikmet Çetin and the Under-Secretary of the MFA, Korkmaz Haktanır.

Keen diplomatic interest in Barzani’s consultations in Ankara

Noteworthy was the fact that a number of Western ambassadors also had talks with Barzani in Ankara. These included the German, British and Kuwaiti Ambassadors, Hans-Joachim Vergau, David Logan and Abdullah A.M. Al-Murad, as well as the Charge d’Affaires of France on Wednesday, in that order. Barzani’s right hand man, Sami Abdurrahman told the press that the American Ambassador, Mark Parris, would see Barzani at the end of the Ankara talks.

MFA Spokesman Necati Utkan said on Wednesday, “In Northern Iraq we are closely cooperating with the KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party). We have fought terrorism together. It is most natural that our cooperation will be sustained.” He said that Barzani was going to America at Washington’s invitation and that he would hold consultations with Turkey before these talks. “The United States has explained these invitations as an effort for the maintenance of stability in Northern Iraq and manifesting its support for the parties concerned.”

The KDP representative in Ankara, Sefin Dizayi, said that Barzani’s consultations concerned regional relations, security, economic cooperation and such topics as the North Watch Operation in Northern Iraq by the USA from Incirlik.

Prior to these developments, the Turkish press quoted Martin Indyk, an Assistant Secretary of State, as saying at a Senate Subcommittee in Washington that they were planning to topple Saddam Hussein by reinforcing the dissidents of the Baghdad Administration.

Ecevit said after his talks with Barzani, “For the sake of the balances in the region, we attach great importance to the maintenance of Iraq’s territorial integrity. I see that Mr Barzani and his colleagues also share this outlook. The vacuum of authority in Northern Iraq should be filled, but in doing so no harm should be inflicted on Iraq’s territorial integrity.” He complained that some “non-regional countries” were not helping the implementation of the Ankara Process that aimed at sustaining peace among several Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq. Certain newspapers, namely Radikal (5^th) took it as an indirect reference to the United States.

Ecevit said that they explained to Barzani that Turkey is a source of balance and stability in the region.

There was a general consensus between Barzani and the Turkish Government that the agreement signed in the 70s for autonomy to the Kurds in Northern Iraq should be implemented now. The institutions to be created in Northern Iraq after the elections should not be of a nature of a separate Government from that of Baghdad, Turkey urged the KDP.

Barzani agreed to improve relations and sustain the dialogue with the central government in Baghdad after his return from Washington. He complained that Tehran’s support of Jelal Talabani’s PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) was causing problems for the maintenance of peace in the region. There were certain disquieting developments of late between Talabani and Tehran that were allowing the PKK to use its territory as a springboard for infiltration into Turkey, according to Barzani’s explanations in Ankara.

Ecevit said at his press conference after the talks that they had recently received complaints that the Saddam Administration was supporting the PKK and that Barzani confirmed it. He noted that it was Syria and Iran who were supporting the PKK. Baghdad’s joining them in this support would be prejudicial to Iraq’s own national interests. The PKK being a separatist gathering, Iraq’s territorial integrity would suffer from it, rather than Turkey’s, he stressed.

The attacks by the PKK on the Turkmen community and institutions in Erbil and Dohuk on August 10^th were also brought up at the Ankara talks. The Turkish Government strongly demanded the safeguard of the security of the Turkmen community in Northern Iraq. Barzani expressed regret for the events and promised to compensate the damage. He said certain quarters that wanted to foul good relations between Turkey and the KDP had perpetrated these crimes. They would strongly punish the perpetrators.

After the Washington talks Barzani will stop over in London and Paris for further talks and come back to Ankara to explain the developments.

What might be the outcome of the Washington talks?

This diplomatic hovering around Barzani by both Turkey and Western countries is enough to show the importance attached to the Washington talks ahead. It is also a good example of the distrust shown to each side by the other on this issue.

Now the big question is what if Ankara is not satisfied with the outcome of the Washington talks. The answer rests in the historic background.

In the aftermath of the Gulf war when Saddam Hussein was on a short leash with the US, British and French planes flying regularly over a protected zone to keep Saddam Hussein’s troops at bay, there were serious American efforts to create a Kurdish State with Erbil as its capital. These efforts simply flopped due to the lack of support from Turkey even though they coincided with Ankara’s preoccupation with the PKK terrorism that had risen to the level of a civil war with heavy arms supplies from abroad to its estimated 15,000 guerrillas.

It was not long before the western world realized that it was impossible to unite the Barzani and Talabani tribes around a united government. The two rival guerrilla factions have fought with each other for over a year, mostly due to their failure to share the public revenue. Then just as a cease-fire took hold between the KDP and PUK with also Turkey’s contributions to the Anglo-American efforts, the PKK jumped into the fray. On August 25^th, 1995, PKK terrorists attacked Barzani’s forces that had not yet become totally pro-Turkish, though it was a friendly Kurdish faction for Turkey. An estimated force of 3,000 PKK guerrillas went on the offensive in Northern Iraq in the hope of expanding its beachhead there - particularly at Barzani’s expense.

The PKK’s hope of Talabani’s joining forces with them against their arch-enemy KDP was dashed when PUK stayed on the sidelines while the PKK offensive collapsed in a total rout.

According to Barzani sources, the PKK lost as many as 1,000 guerrillas, probably the PKK’s worst single defeat in a decade-long armed struggle and it came at the hands of fellow Kurds. The loss of a base of operations in Northern Iraq was a milestone in the PKK’s armed uprising against Turkey. “We have a chance to destroy a good part of the PKK. This defeat seriously harms their ability to fight Turkey,” said Barzani at that time.

Barzani has remained on friendly terms with Ankara, mostly because Turkey controls the Iraqi Kurds’ lifeline, the Habur bridge and the vital highway leading into Northern Iraq. Diesel and crude oil supplies to Turkey through this route is the main income of the Barzanis and the reason for the Talabanis fight against them.

Also, Turkey has now been deeply settled in Northern Iraq controlled by Barzani and there are security arrangements between the two. Furthermore, the Turkmen community is getting organized and becoming an economic and political force in the region with Turkey’s help. Ankara’s friendly relations with Baghdad is another trump card up Ankara’s sleeves in this issue.

It does not matter what a superpower the United States is today. If the much less advantageous conditions of Turkey in the post Gulf War period did not allow the Western Powers to create an independent Kurdish State because of Ankara’s objection, how can the current Washington talks achieve this result for them?

Everyone has already come to realize that Turkey is the key for any such major developments in this region and a Kurdish UDI or arrangements leading to it are the last things any Turkish Government can possibly accept in any foreseeable future. uras@ada.net.tr, September 6^th, 1998

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