HAS THE INFLUENCE OF THE MILITARY BEEN WEAKENED?

 

It is extensively claimed in the Turkish and world media that the influence of the military has been weakened in Turkey especially after the legislation of the “seventh parcel” concerning the constitutional amendments passed before the parliamentary recess, with the end in view of conforming to the Copenhagen criteria for accession to the EU. The main point in these amendments was reducing the number of military members of the National Security Council, terminating the executive functions of the NSC and making it merely a consultative body on national security issues. Washington was particularly keen on curbing the NSC’s influence and the military’s role in Turkey, as evidenced by Rumsfeld’s letter to PM Tayyip Erdogan concerning the Suleymaniye events in July, but how realistic was this external ambition? For an impartial analysis of the situation in Turkey about the NSC please read the article below.

 The answer to the question in the heading is simply a huge “No”. It is simply because the external wishes to curb the influence of the military in Turkey and their extensions in this country, which Pulse uniquely and persistently calls the Disinformation Mechanism, are based on misinformation and fallacies. Consequently, the amendments in question serve no other purpose than changing the appearance to satisfy Europe and America, without touching on the core of the issue. It is because it is a matter of life or death for Turkey that the Ataturk reforms that make this country unique in the Islamic world in living up to west European democratic standards should be preserved at any cost. There is no question of weakening the role and influence of the military in Turkey just to satisfy some misguided foreigners as it is tantamount to weakening parliamentary democracy. 

In fact, nothing much is changing in the NSC in practice

Above all, the National Security Council is not a kind of parliament where the military and civilian members clash all the time by voting as the local and foreign media depict all the time, but it is a prestigious high constitutional organ of a consultative nature on national security issues. Its decisions are not taken by vote as the press wrongly claims constantly but by consensus. The weight of the military is certainly mighty, not because there have been five top commanders and the NSC Secretary General, another five-star general hitherto, but because of the scientific and objective appraisals of the military on defence and security issues. Which civilian authority can contest the validity of the commanders’ plans and designs on matters of war and defence. Whether there are 5-6 four-star general or only the Chief of the TGS in the NSC is of little importance. The other 4-5 generals never contest the views of the top commander anyway. The Turkish military tradition is that defence questions are freely discussed in an utmost democratic way among the commanders and once a consensus is reached and the top commander says the last word, everyone unites around that idea, even though some may have defended the opposite view during the deliberations.

Again there is no truth in the claim that the NSC was a powerful executive body hitherto and it has now become an impotent consultative organ with no staff for executive duties. It is true that the NSC previously had an impressive secretariat with high ranking representatives from every ministry which is now disappearing. In practice it  doesn’t mean much. A friend of mine from the MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) was once assigned to the NSC Secretariat. He was a high-ranking Turkish diplomat who had just saved his life from an Asala attempt thanks to the bullet-proof car provided to him as the consul-general in a west European port city. Asked what he did in the NSC my friend said, “Nothing is as excited as it sounds. Nobody asks me about foreign policy. I am in no position to give any answers anyway. I have no access to the Ministry’s files.” About the representatives of the other ministries and departments he said it was the same for them too. They were all people that had been broken off from their original departments, no matter how high positions they once occupied there.

The only exception to this fact that the NSC never had much of an executive role is that after the 27 February 1997 session of the Council, which eventually resulted in the downfall of the Erbakan-Ciller coalition with its reactionary tendencies, the NSC fulfilled some executive duties about chasing and curbing religious fundamentalism in Turkey, and even that was somewhat checked by the Mesut Yilmaz-Bulent Ecevit coalition that ensued Erbakan-Ciller.

What is the importance of dismantling the NSC secretariat now under these conditions? And what realism is there in expectations that with the seventh parcel the military has been considerably weakened in Turkey?

Rumsfeld’s unrealistic expectations about Turkey’s Iraq policy

Rumsfeld’s letter to PM Erdogan after the 4 July Hill Billy attack on Turkish special forces in Suleymaniye was taken in Ankara as a direct American initiative to put its influence on channelling Turkey’s Iraq policy from the military towards the civilian authorities. Yet sending forces to a foreign country and guiding its performance there is totally a military affair. Will the “third lieutenant” Abdullah Gul or Tayyip Erdogan command the Turkish brigade in Iraq if the Turkish force deployment in that country is finally determined by Parliament? It is apparent that after Wolfowitcz’s express complaint that the TGS did not fulfil its leadership duty about sending forces to Iraq on 1 March, Rumsfeld is also repeating such erroneous outlooks. What’s more he is making it obvious that the Special Forces’ performance in Northern Iraq should come to an end and Foreign Minister Gul seems to agree with it provided that the PKK is dismantled in Northern Iraq. Yet the 19 March Ankara declaration by Turkey, the United States and the Iraqi opposition is express about having no separate forces by any community of Iraq, by the Kurds, in this case. So no matter what Foreign Minister Gul says about withdrawing the Turkish forces in northern Iraq after the dismantling and disarmament of the PKK/KADEK, it is doubtful that such a thing will happen unless the Barzani and Talabani peshmerges are also dismantled.

These points will now be clearly determined with written American pledges before the Turkish Parliament votes on the troop shipment to Iraq. The American answer to the TGS’s questions about technical matters concerning the Turkish Force deployment in Iraq has reached Ankara and it is reportedly, by and large, acceptable to Turkey, leaving the command of the forces and the governance of their area to the Turkish commanders. This is the first impression, however, and it is hoped that the devil is not in the detail. The contacts between Ankara and Washington continue in both capitals and the Turkish Parliament may hold an emergency session in early September to take a decision about force deployment in Iraq.

Retired Generals and FM Gul say the same thing amidst disinformation

Rumsfeld’s and Wolfowitcz’s misjudgements about the TGS being responsible for the 1 March rebuttal of the Turkish Parliament showed its impact in Turkey’s notorious Disinformation Mechanism last week. When the retiring First Army Commander, General Cetin Dogan, said about the possible Turkish troop deployment in Iraq that the people were still querying about why the Turks spilled their blood in Galicia (Austria) and the Yemen in World War I, the Disinformation Mechanism, led by Hurriyet editorialist Ertugrul Ozkok and Milliyet columnist Taha Akyol, started a broadside against him with far-fetched statements and accusations, with the belief that he and other retiring generals were opposing Turkish troop deployment in Iraq.

The belief was totally wrong and General Dogan’s clarifications on Thursday (20^th) during his delivery of duty to General Buyukanit could not even pass the Disinformation Mechanism’s horrible censorship in the media. If his statement had not been cut out by the media it would have been seen that he was expressly saying that he was not against sending Turkish soldiers abroad, but sending them under certain conditions. These conditions are exactly the same as FM Abdullah Gul’s statement which hit Milliyet’s headline on Friday (22^nd), “Our strategic interests cannot be trapped within Anatolia. Turkey will get its rights from the oil in Iraq.”

The Foreign Minister further said, “It is a pity that the Americans fell into the position of an occupation force after the invasion. They won an easy victory. They received no reaction in the first weeks. They failed to establish good relations with the people and could not win them over.” About the difference between the American forces in Iraq and the potential Turkish ones, he said, “If we go to Iraq we definitely have no occupation force identity. We would go there if we can make a contribution to the Iraqi people. I said it in also Washington. We would go there with a vast political vision. We cannot be a gendarme, military or police force. We will go there with humanitarian aims.”

A close scrutiny of retired Generals Dogan’s and Tuncer Kilinc’s statements show that they say nothing different, but they simply oppose the disinformation mongers who skew their words in order to get “green card” facilities, as Gen Dogan has put it.

Americans face International Jihad activists that Turkey can avoid

Meanwhile violence in Iraq, including stupidly unjust ones such as the assassination of the UN envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello, continue apparently with an eye to having deterrents for countries like Turkey sending troops to Iraq. What impact it may have on other countries remains to be seen. As for Turkey, it can confidently be said that it would have the exact opposite impact on the Turks and intensify their intention to send forces there, rather than give into violence.

The Anglo-Americans’ assessment of the latest situation in Iraq is that above and beyond the Saddam factor, the Iraq question has become a case of a war of independence for the Islamic extremists against the Americans, just like it was the case in Afghanistan for the Soviet invaders a couple of decades ago. Despite the advantages of being a next-door neighbour to that country, the almighty Red Army could not cope with the Afghan fighters and had to withdraw in defeat. Today the same fate is in store for the Anglo-American invaders in Iraq if this assessment is correct, and by all indications it is.

There is, however, one big difference between these two cases. In the case of Afghanistan, the CIA was clearly behind Taliban and Al Qaeda fighting the Soviets, but in the case of Iraq today neither Moscow nor any other power seems to be behind the Islamic fundamentalists. From Saudi Arabia 3000 activists have infiltrated into Iraq and there may be other guerrilla forces from other Islamic countries, but they cannot possibly be any match to the American support to the Afghans via Pakistan and Saudi Arabia against the Soviet invasion forces.

The success of the Turkish soldiers depends on Turkey’s capability to show to the Iraqi people the difference between the “American occupation forces” and Turkey’s potential humanitarian force that has been pointed out by Foreign Minister Gul. The Turkish commanders say nothing different, but they do not want the civilian government to hide behind the military in Parliament after having joined forces with some external quarters in order to curb their influence in the country.  uras@ada.net.tr – August 23^rd. 2003