ECONOMIC CRISIS MAY CAUSE ELECTION POSTPONEMENT, BUT…

At a time when all hope was dashed of deferring general elections from April 1999, CHP Chairman Deniz Baykal, the politician who forced PM Yılmaz to an early election next April, spoke from the Georgian frontier, “I’m herewith releasing the PM from his promise to me. He can do whatever he wants about postponing the elections.” Instrumental in this development were the economic crisis in Russia and Turkey and business quarters’ threats that during the election campaign they would hold Baykal responsible for upsetting the economic program. A little known Constitutional obligation puts Baykal in a corner. So does the Government’s ongoing anti-Mafia policy.

Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz surprised everyone, even his closest colleague in the Cabinet, Deputy PM Ecevit, by saying in Gaziantep about two weeks ago that he had cursorily decided on moving forward the general elections to April 1999 under the pressure of the CHP Chairman, Deniz Baykal, because otherwise it was impossible to pass the reform bills through Parliament. His reluctance to hold the local and general elections together was continuing, but he was honour bound to his promise to Baykal, he said.

This statement, along with the heavy pressure of the business circles of Istanbul and other cities, triggerred off a public argument about the pros and cons of postponing the general elections.

Ecevit said that the Prime Minister’s statement in Gaziantep was a surprise for him and that he would dicuss it with him on his return to Ankara. Rather than changing the election date, Baykal’s call for a “low profile election government” after Mesut Yılmaz’s resignation at the end of the year should be changed, he suggested, because it meant wasting 5-6 months with such a government.

In the end, the tendency settled down in the country that there was nothing else that could be done in this regard because the decision for early elections had been taken by an overwhelming majority in Parliament - 488 of the total of 540 members that existed.

The opposition blamed PM Mesut Yılmaz for being hesitant and trying to break his promise, but Yılmaz clarified that the media had not reflected the event properly. It was the Mayor of Gaziantep, a CHP member, who first suggested separating and deferring the general elections from the local elections next April, and his statement was an answer to that remark.

Nevertheless, the tendency was, after two weeks of contradictory press reports and public statements, that it was now too late to backtrack on Parliament’s decision.

Just at that point, on September 12^th, Baykal said from a distant corner of the country, Artvin, that he was releasing Mesut Yılmaz from his promise to him about the general elections in April. He could do whatever he wanted about the general elections.

It was not clear if Baykal’s “generosity” of releasing the Prime Minister from his promise also covered the obligation to resign at the end of the year, but Mesut Yılmaz proved what a promising young politician he is by promptly rejecting Baykal’s offer. He also brought clarity to a constitutional obligation that was little known by even competent politicians and party leaders.

Mesut Yılmaz said on September 13^th that Baykal’s setting him free of his promise meant nothing because it was no longer a matter between Baykal and himself, but a parliamentary resolution had been taken for general elections in April 1999. His party would not take the initiative to change that resolution when Parliament reopened in October. The CHP could do so if it wanted and Parliament would then consider what to do about it.

He repeated that he had reluctantly accepted holding the two elections together in April 1999 as a “lesser of two evils” because otherwise the CHP would not support the bills in Parliament. PM Yılmaz also brought clarity to a constitutional obligation that had not been understood by the other party leaders. For instance, Baykal, Ecevit, Çiller, Kutan and other party leaders or politicians have all been talking of holding the general elections at the end of this year or in the Autumn of 1999. According to Mesut Yılmaz it would be unconstitutional and he is right. Why?

General elections in April 1999 or in second half of 2000 as a constitutional requirement

Article 77 of the Constitution stipulates that parliamentary elections shall be held every five years. The second paragraph of the article authorizes Parliament to hold early elections if it so resolves. Article 127 of the Constitution stipulates that local elections shall be held every five years, but it has no such following paragraph as exists in Article 77 for parliamentary elections. In the 80s the Özal Government passed a bill for early local elections, but it was repealed by the Constitutional Court. Local elections have to be held at the end of March 1999 or within a few weeks.

Article 127 was amended in 1995 to stipulate that if parliamentary general or by-elections are to be held within a year from the local elections they have to be held together.

As the local elections are the anchor, that is to say they have to be held in March or April 1999 under the Constitutional Court’s ruling, the date for parliamentary elections has to be geared to it. For that reason, PM Yılmaz believes that it is not possible to hold early general elections between April 18^th, 1998 and April 18^th, 2000, a year before or after the April 1999 local elections. If there is to be any postponement of the general elections from April 1999 it means holding the general elections at the proper time of November 2000 or maybe a few months earlier, but not earlier than April 18^th, 2000.

How the events will unroll when Parliament reopens within a couple of weeks remains to be seen. As things stand at the time of writing this article it was not clear if there would be a postponement of the general elections or even a change of Government at the end of the year.

The pressure of business quarters and public opinion to postpone the elections continues. International economic authorities such as the IMF and the World Bank, knowingly or unknowingly, support it. All over the front page of the Yeni Yüzyıl (September 13^th) newspaper, the heading reads, “The Turkey expert of the world’s foremost rating company warns: (early) Elections will be a disaster.” The current financial crisis in Turkey is blamed as much on early general elections as on Russian developments. In his current election campaign, Baykal feels that the people are blaming him for it.

CHP’s problems and desperate efforts to enter the Government

State Minister Mustafa Yılmaz (DSP), who is Ecevit’s right-hand man for domestic policy issues, said last week that even though they were a three-party minority Government they had been very successful. “But certain parties are uneasy with this success. I’ve not been able to understand why CHP wants to have early elections. I’d love to know if there is anyone who understands it. I’ve been touring throughout Anatolia and the more I tour the less I understand it. The CHP has serious problems. Mr Baykal is being misled by opinion polls carried out without going to the people.”

Deniz Baykal’s statement to an audience of a few hundred people at an open air rally in Artvin last week was a proof of how desperate he is about postponing the elections to the normal time, November 2000. There are several reasons, but it goes much deeper than the business circles’ pressure on him. It is also deeper than winning or losing the elections. It is directly concerned with the Government’s present policy of fighting the Mafia that has infiltrated into the Government and Bureaucracy over the recent years, mostly during the Çiller-Baykal period.

After the Prime Minister’s return to Ankara from Gaziantep, Mesut Yılmaz and Bülent Ecevit reviewed the conditions about postponing the April 1999 general elections. They came to the conclusion that rather than taking such a step they should focus on retaining the current Government until the elections, with or without Yılmaz. This was because if they accepted the postponement with Baykal’s “generosity” they would continue to be dependent on his support in Parliament or include him in the Government. Ecevit is resolute about keeping away from Baykal. He says, “There is harmony in the Government. There is not much harmony within ANAP and even less within the DTP, but there is a harmony within the Government. We would have problems if we allowed this harmony to be upset. Certain comprehensive alterations in the Government would entail a certain amount of uncertainties. Would this harmony still continue, no one can tell.”

Ecevit dreads that admitting CHP into the coalition as the forth partner would undermine their economic stability program and adversely affect the ongoing fight against the Mafia infiltration in the Government. And the fear is not unfounded.

The fight started against the Mafia infiltration after the National Security Council resolution at its May 27^th session uncovered a minor businessman with multiple names, Erol Evcil (who also calls himself Erol Eşrefoğlu at times) was accorded TL11 trillion loans by İşbank. The CHP, which owns 28% of İşbank in accordance with Atatürk’s will, has not done anything to prevent these irregularly disbursed loans, and is still doing nothing about it today, even though it has four members on the İşbank Board of Governors. These CHP members are Enis Tütüncü, Mustafa Timisi, Mustafa Özyürek and Erbaşar Özsoy. The press challenges them to take action by writing, “If you are afraid of a lack of evidence to prove corruption, let us provide you with it.”

What’s more, an advancing investigation proves that the dimensions of the matter exceed the limits of an ordinary corruption case and evidence that comes to the daylight lead the security forces towards the Mafia/politician cooperation.

Finance Minister Zekeriya Temizel is marching in great resolve against the cooperation of corrupt businessmen and politicians by using the tax experts he has under him. MIT under its new chief Şenkal Atasagun, the Police under its new chief Necati Bilican and the Ministry of the Interior under the new Minister, Kutlu Aktaş, as well as the Military with its intelligence, the Gendarmerie and units throughout the country constitute an excellent team. They are all determined to uproot this politician/Mafia infiltration in the system in accordance with the NSC resolutions.

In this fight, Temizel’s fiscal experts find in their way İşbank’s governors who reportedly threaten the investigators that they would get into trouble if they went on with the investigation. They also ban İşbank managers from cooperating with the fiscal inspectors.

The CHP’s involvement in this corruption is not crystal clear yet, but Evcil is accused of financing Mafia godfathers like Alaattin Çakıcı who is under arrest in France. This financing originates from İşbank’s TL11 trillion loans to Evcil with the alleged help of CHP board members.

Similar corruption cases involving the Istanbul Municipality under CHP mayors before the March 1994 local elections resulted in the loss of this metropolitan municipality to religious politicians. Ecevit seems to be determined to keep the present Government free of such dangers in the forthcoming elections. uras@ada.net.tr, September 14^th, 1998