TURKPULSE No:114..........JANUARY 31st 2004
CYPRUS – DID TURKISH DIPLOMACY SCORE A MAJOR GOAL?
PM Erdogan’s contacts with the Bush Administration in Washington threw the ball into the Greek court for the impasse at the Cyprus talks within UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s goodwill mission. It may be a major achievement for the Turkish Government which had managed to work out a single joint Turkish and Turkish Cypriot text over the Annan plan if it eventually undoes the other side’s “take-it-or-leave-it” ultimatum and by all indications it is doing so. The following is the interesting background and aspects of this achievement of Turkish diplomacy which left the Greek side perplexed, if not in shock.
As late as January 8th, 2004, American Ambassador Michael Klosson was publicly announcing that there was no question of them preferring an ideal Cyprus plan to the Annan plan. “There is no such preference, no such plan. The preference is between negotiating the Annan plan or no solution.” The relevant UN and EU quarters were speaking no differently and stressing that there is not much room to make changes in the Annan plan, neither the time until May 1st when the Greek Cypriot side will become a full member of the EU with a claim to representing the whole of the island. The Turkish side has no alternative but to take on the Annan plan with some minor adjustments or leave it, they were claiming. The EU Commissioner for expansion, Verheugen, was going even further and claiming that the Turkish forces in Cyprus would be an occupation force after the Greek Cypriots’ accession.
A different tone from the Annan plan advocates after PM Erdogan’s visits
PM Erdogan’s contacts in Washington with President Bush and other American rulers, as well as his talk with Kofi Annan in Davos on his way to the United States last week, however, seem to have broken this deadlock in favour of Turkey.
Actually, what Turkey has been demanding for the solution of the Cyprus problem is not at all excessive and the Annan plan ostensibly accords them to the Turkish side. These indispensable points are:
Under the 1959 London and Zurich agreements and the 1960 Constitution and the guarantee agreement, all these points have already become treaty rights for the Turkish side. All the inter-communal negotiations since the Turkish intervention in July 1974 have confirmed these points. Into the bargain, the Annan plan was ostensibly confirming this bicommunal, bizonal structure and basing the new “State of Cyprus” on two “component States”, the Turkish and Greek Cypriot ones. It was also making the final agreement subject to the “yes” or “no” votes of a democratic referendum to be held by the two peoples.
President Denktas sees through “traps” in the Annan plan
While most of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot peoples, in their eagerness to become EU citizens as soon as possible, jumped at the “opportunity” ostensibly offered by the Annan plan, President Denktas resisted all pressures to sign it within a few days and claimed traps and devils in the detail of the agreement much to the disappointment of the Washington led Turkish and world media. His skilful leadership in this opposition split the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot public opinions into two, with equally skilful leaders like Ambassador Ilter Turkmen in Turkey and now PM Mehmet Ali Talat in the TRNC leading the opposition to Denktas.
With PM Tayyip Erdogan and FM Abdullah Gul, who have obviously tied their political future and career to EU accession also favouring a quick solution to the Cyprus problem, the pendulum clearly swung against Denktas at the beginning, especially when the Annan plan was altered twice in a way to counter his criticisms.
A case in point was the “component States” definition of the first Annan plan. About this unheard of definition Denktas was quick to take advantage of its peculiarities and translated the “component state” into Turkish as “parca devlet,” “a piece state”. It was eventually changed into “constituent States” and approached Denktas’s call for the two founder states.
Despite these improvements, however, Denktas went on with his fight and eventually turned the pendulum in his favour by both frustrating the external plans for a landslide victory for the Talat front at the TRNC elections and by undermining the Erdogan Government’s keen interest in getting rid of the biggest stumbling block, Cyprus, for Turkey’s accession to the EU.
He won over President Sezer and the military in this fight. Careful scrutiny of the plan by experts brought to daylight the details of the Annan plan which indeed contained big “black holes”, for the Turkish side, to say the least.
The Denktas front in Turkey stressed the above three main points that are incontestable prerequisites for any Turk and even any goodwilled foreigners for a solution in Cyprus. That is why they focused on the details of the Annan plan which went against these three principles.
The background to drafting a document called “The Turkish Stance on Cyprus”
The Erdogan Government decided last October to prepare the Turkish answer to the 150-page Annan plan and a mixed team of MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) led by Under-Secretary Ugur Ziyal and TGS (Turkish General Staff) led by Deputy Chief, TGS, General Ilker Basbug, started work on the plan. In the last weeks of 2003 the work drew to an end with a split between the two. While the MFA accepted the external pressure that the Turkish thesis should be based on the Annan plan after some improvements, the TGS maintained that the Annan plan was unacceptable because it addressed none of the three above points.
The Disinformation Mechanism of the Turkish media, especially Hasan Cemal of Milliyet, campaigning for the Annan plan, was not satisfied with the news of a difference of opinion between the MFA and the TGS and went as far as casting aspersions on the commanders. In their attempt to weaken the military, they claimed a split between the “reasonable” Chief TGS Gen Hilmi Ozkok and the alleged “revolution mongers”.
President Sezer chaired a summit in Cankaya on January 8th with PM Tayyip Erdogan, General Ozkok, Foreign Minister Gul and Ugur Ziyal in attendance before the finishing touches were given to the single Turkish text called “The Turkish Stance Document on Cyprus”.
Before the President’s initiative which paved the way for the appearance of the “Stance Document” at the NSC meeting in Cankaya on January 23rd, the leftist daily “Cumhuriyet” ( December 29th, January 5th and 7th) published a military report accusing the MFA of “defeatism” and adopting the “relinquish-and-get-rid-of” stance over Cyprus. PM Erdogan and General Ozkok held a nearly two-hour meeting on December 29th, in an attempt to bridge the gap. On January 5th the Council of Ministers discussed the matter and announced full accord with the military. Two days afterwards, however, Cumhuriyet (7th) published the Military’s “discord” report with the MFA.
That there has been a rift over Cyprus between the MFA and the TGS is an undeniable fact, but are the claims of the split among the commanders true? Those who are familiar with military traditions and the work principles of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) know well that such a thing is impossible. The democratic principles of the TAF within its high discipline allows every commander to freely express his opinion on a policy, but once the top commander says the final word they all gather around that principle regardless of previous difference of opinion. That was the case this time too and discord mongers like Hasan Cemal were only serving the Disinformation Mechanism by claiming rifts in the top brass. General Basbug explained this matter as follows at his press conference on January 16th:
‘The views of the TGS have been formed with the contributions of the Service Commanders and the Gendarmerie. The views of the Turkish Armed Forces are formed after seeking the views of the Service Commanders and the Gendarmerie Commander. The TGS’s views on Cyprus were also worked out that way. The TGS’s views were formed at the TGS Headquarters after seeking the views of the Services and the Gendarmerie on December 19th and January 2nd and it was presented to the Cankaya summit as the views of the TGS.” General Basbug dismissed claims of rifts among the top commanders and said that it was normal to express different ideas during the formation of the TGS’s outlook. He tried to refrain from answering a persistent question about if the TGS would base its outlook on the Annan plan and said in the end, “What is important is to establish well what the indispensable limits for Turkey and the TRNC are on Cyprus. You can then call it the Annan plan or not.”
The announcement of the NSC on 23 January did not “base” the Turkish document on the Annan plan, but only talked of the UN Secretary-General’s good offices and a solution in “reference to the Annan plan”.
The TGS report agrees with Denktas’s claim of “traps” in the Annan plan
“In conclusion,” reads the TGS report, “it clearly appears that the MFA is sustaining its efforts for accepting the Annan plan as is (i.e. as it stands) after some minor rectifications on 5-6 articles, without touching on its substance or philosophy. As is known, the Annan plan is not a durable or sustainable solution. It is based on assimilating the Turkish existence on the island by terminating bizonality therein and imprisoning Turkey to Anatolia by expelling the Turkish Army from the island. In the event of enforcing it in an atmosphere where Turkey is not an EU member, the Annan plan is an implementation that puts an end to the Turkish-Greek balance which was established in the Eastern Mediterranean with the 1960 treaties.”
About the political equality and sovereignty on the island the report calls for a “lasting structure” that forestalls the weakening of the Turkish Cypriot existence in the common organs of the new State. “This structure which seems to exist at the outset of the Annan plan disappears because of the erosion of the bizonality,” stresses the report. It complains that not a single Turk from the mainland will be able to migrate to the island if the Annan plan’s legal system is adopted.
President Denktas and his supporters maintain that there are more than 80 thousand pages in the documents attached to the Annan plan and that the rights and facilities accorded to the Turks in the main text of the Annan plan are deceitfully taken back with devious ways in these annexes.
Guneri Civaoglu writes in Milliyet (28th), “The beginning and headlines of the Annan plan contain formulas and assurances of a relaxed nature for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. But the following paragraphs and provisions of exceptions withdraw almost all of them.” He gives the following examples for these “black holes”. The headlines and general rules provide for relinquishing 21% of the TRNC lands to the Greeks. But plus 10%, plus work places, plus lands to the Maronites and certain other exceptions increase that rate to 50% in five to 15 years.
Likewise, the provision under the heading “population movements” the State in the north will accept refugees from the south only up to 21% of its population. Yet following provisions and exceptions increase it to 92,000 Greeks while reducing the Turks to 155,000. So the proportional representation system in the Federal House of Representatives enables the Greeks to have 50% of the Turks’ seats. Likewise the Senate seemingly contains an equal number of senators (25 each), but half of the Turkish quota becomes Greek in practice. The same is the case for the Presidential Council. Of the two Turkish members one may well be a Greek. There are also unacceptable restrictions for the Turkish forces in Cyprus.
A solution by 1 May? A miracle indeed unless the Turkish plan is applied
Needless to say, starting the talks and winding them up by 1 May is simply a miracle under these conditions. Everybody is aware of it and everyone seems to have engineered a device for an agreement (or no agreement) before this deadline. The Greek device is apparently no solution by putting the blame on Denktas. In this case they will not be able to get land concessions but it does not bother them too much as long as they have EU accession and keep Turkey out of the European integration.
The Annan plan’s device is a referendum by the two peoples, without any clarity about what if one side rejects the plan at the referendum. They seem to believe that it will not be the Turkish side that will reject it, because it is very unlikely that the Turkish Cypriots would vote themselves out of Europe if they were promised immediate accession to the European labour markets in case of a “yes” majority. The Greeks ostensibly express concern about the referendum. But it is certainly nothing but a tactic. They have everything to gain from the Annan arrangements and these are long term strategic gains and not just a few hotels to be handed back to them in Varosha.
As for the Turkish side, their latest and ingenious tactic is discussing and signing a “skeleton Annan plan” that contains the headings and general rules, but excludes the thousand and one traps in 80 thousand pages of details.
Will Turkey be able to achieve this target with the USA’s support in exchange for certain vague Turkish concessions to them in the Middle East and Eurasia under the title ‘strategic cooperation’? There was certainly a lot of talk about “Strategic cooperation” during and after the Erdogan visit to the United States, but no one in Turkey was any wiser about what it actually meant. One thing was crystal clear at the end of the visit, however, and that is the fact that if there is to be a total or partial solution to the Cyprus problem by May 1st, it will, by and large, be within the “Turkish Stance on the Cyprus Document”. uras@ada.net.tr - January 31st, 2004