CYPRUS AGREEMENT, IS IT ROUND THE CORNER?

The Kofi Annan plan for a solution for the Cyprus problem is clearly the work of American judicial experts, but contrary to the enormous disappointments Turkey has suffered from American diplomacy in recent years, especially in the aftermath of the Gulf war, it seems it is not too prejudicial against Turkey. President Denktas and former PM Ecevit, along with his colleagues do not think so, but at the moment they are in the minority. Most people in Turkey believe that the time has come for a breakthrough on Cyprus and the latest plan may constitute a good basis for a fair solution provided that certain improvements are made on land concessions and the “traps” that the sceptics claim exist therein. Even though this was initially the predominant feeling among the people including Pulse, with the explanations of neutral experts the pendulum has begun to swing the other way. It is especially critical for Tayyip Erdogan whose Foreign Minister, Yasar Yakis, is now in New York having consultations with Denktas. Will Erdogan, in his struggle to become Prime Minister with the West’s help, understand the justified Turkish anxieties about the Annan plan and stop repeating certain public statements prejudicial to Turkey’s security or will he persist in the wrong and, in pleasing the West, totally justify the anxieties of Turkish authorities about his past?      

The timing of the Kofi Annan report with its 12 December deadline for the final answer and other procedures was dreadful, given the fact that President Denktas was in New York in hospital with a very critical heart operation and that there was no government in Turkey following the 3 November general elections. The belief that the Americans had deliberately arranged this timing to extract maximum concessions from the Turkish side was a deterrent in itself for the Turks against this plan.

Annan’s devil is in the detail

Yet close scrutiny of the 9-page executive summary of the plan shows that it is not such a deplorable document or a plot after all, but, on the contrary, is quite an even handed proposal that is negotiable to say the least. But as expected a document aimed at putting an end to a 40-year old chronic dispute with hot confrontations and world wide consequences is bound to meet with suspicion and the mistake in its timing added insult into injury, inducing the Turkish side to extra care and suspicion.

The main objections of the Turkish side boil down to excessive land concessions claimed, the rules about resettlement of the people and security arrangements with an international force on the Turkish sector of the island. With two maps in the appendix the Turkish side is expected to reduce its lands from 36% of the island to 28.5% and neither of the maps can possibly be acceptable to any Turkish government as the lands to be relinquished according to this plan are considerably undermining Turkish interests, indeed survival on the island. Both the outgoing Ecevit Government and President Denktas have flatly rejected these maps and proposals as a basis for negotiations.

Surprise support for the plan came from President Evren who said that their military plans for Cyprus were more moderate and that the Turkish Army moved forward beyond the intended boundries because the Greeks fled and the Turkish forces filled the vacuum with the intention of relinquishing some of it during the final solution. The Prime Minister of this military operation in 1974, Bulent Ecevit expressed disapproval of this statement and qualified it as wrong, but President Evren’s words were absolutely right and the news had first been reported by Pulse back in 1974-75. At that time PM Ecevit made two attempts to sue and prosecute the Pulse editor Vedat Uras, but he got nowhere with the independent judiciary refusing even to take action about it.

It is a fact that Varosha, next to the port of Famagusta, has been kept idle for more than a quarter of a century with the intention of relinquishing it at the final settlement. In 1982 the military rule under President Evren induced President Denktas to further land concessions by agreeing to reduce the Turkish lands from 36% to “29% plus,” i.e. between 29.1% and 29.9%. That is why Kofi Annan’s 28.5% now is not at all excessive as far as the rates go, but a close scrutiny of the two maps shows that the lands to be relinquished include the most strategic Karpass peninsula, the end bit of the island pointing to the Turkish mainland, or the most fertile sections of the island, the water rich Guzelyurt (Morphou). In the event of losing either of these lands not only the Turkish Cypriots will lose greatly but the security of the Turkish mainland will also be at jeopardy when the Caspian oil reaches the Mediterranean in Ceyhan. That is why, instead of the two maps of the Annan plan, the Turkish side is preparing to offer some lands along the Greek border, where the Turkish Cypriots had neglected to invest with the fear of losing them in the final settlement.

 Bad timing and unacceptable land claims are not the only catch of the plan

Contrary to common belief, land concessions are not expected to be a great hindrance to the final achievement of the plan, but there are more important hindrances that the sceptics describe as “unacceptable traps”. Their explanations have begun to influence the majority of the people including Tayyip Erdogan who has been exerting strenuous efforts to retain the West’s support of himself by describing the critics of the Annan plan “hawks”.

Initially, the Disinformation Mechanism controlled media made a good impact in favour of the Annan plan with its biased assessments. Here is an example of it. Guneri Civaoglu writes in the reputable daily Milliyet (22^nd), “The proposals (of the Annan plan) are not of a kind that can be readily rejected. For the first time the TRNC is accorded political equality. A Common State is founded with the partnership of the two states. For three years the co-presidents of the Turks and Greeks govern the new Common State. Thereafter a revolving presidency is foreseen. The Turks own 28% of the island with their population accounting for 20% of the total. They have the opportunity of having a 50% representation in the state. Previously, no one would even pronounce such advantages for the Turks.”

These arguments uttered over the TV not only by the disinformation mongers, but also by responsible people like retired ambassador Ilter Turkmen, the Foreign Minister of Turkey when the independence of the TRNC (the Turkish Republic of Cyprus) was proclaimed on November 15^th, 1983, had a considerable impact in favour of Annan’s proposals. Meanwhile, Tayyip Erdogan, touring the EU countries along with Foreign Minister Yasar Yakis, was going further and saying in Europe that it was not only the Cyprus issue but also the EU accession and the ESDI/P (European Security and Defence Identity/Policy) should be discussed with Europe and the USA as a part and parcel of a whole.

Security forces begin to divulge realities to counter the West’s offensive

These developments were clear evidences of a coordinated EU-US offensive within an elaborate plan of decades of standing against Turkey’s national interests, beyond any doubt of a conspiracy theory claim. It triggered off the security forces’ counter offensive with their explanations of the realities about the “traps” of Annan plan.

Security and foreign policy experts began to explain to the Turkish public that the 9-page summary was deceptive, that the equality of the Turkish and Greek communities in the new Common State was on paper alone. In practice the plan contained a 20-year resettlement plan involving the return to the Turkish sector of 70,000 Greeks with every facility of the rich Europe and the West. The Turkish Cypriot community being 200,000 strong, it meant one-third of the Turks, and into the bargain there would be others residing in the Turkish sector as Christian Maronites and Armenians but in reality as a part of the Greek Cypriots. Also it was obvious that they would melt away the Turkish community by excluding the Turks that went to the island from Turkey after the 1974 military operation and by also attracting the Turkish Cypriots to Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia and other places as they did before 1974. Thus the equality in the Common State of three representatives each from the Turkish and Greek States would eventually be upset and that one or more Greeks could easily be elected to the Turkish team.

Furthermore, the Turkish sector would have an international force that could only be sent away by the Common State and that the Turkish Army would be reduced to four digits, i.e. be less than 10 thousand. All these arrangements full of pitfalls and traps for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are only part of the dangers involved in the Turks’ accepting the Annan plan, stress civilian and military experts.

As for Tayyip Erdogan’s suggestion in Europe to make a parcel of three different issues –Cyprus, ESDI/P and EU accession, it has already made him the target of both the West and Turkey. All these realities have been explained to him in Ankara and his colleague Yasar Yakis was sent to New York for first-hand information about these traps. Yakis was already doing his utmost during the European tour to make Erdogan refrain from making public statements against Turkey’s established foreign policy. He drew the attack of a British journalist at the press conference in Strasbourg for constantly whispering in Erdogan’s ears. About a question suggesting another arrangement between Turkey and the EU instead of accession to the Union, Yakis tried in vain to explain to Erdogan that the EU accession is a treaty right of Turkey under Article 28 of the Treaty of Ankara and that Turkey would not give up this right for another arrangement. Erdogan had neither understood the question nor was his answer relative in any way. He was saying in his answer that he had started his election campaign from Hakkari etc to an audience that did not have a clue what he was talking about. In short, Tayyip Erdogan is at a crossroads. He will either chose the established Turkish policies and take steps to eventually become a Turkish statesman or consider them as “taboos” to fight against as he had so far tended to do. We will then see what the end will be. No country’s national interests are toys to be played with by incompetent people who grasp the ruling power by hook or by crook. uras@ada.net.tr, November 23^rd, 2002